In service: 10-8 Vol.2: Iss.10, 2002 by Justice Institute of British Columbia (Justice Institute of British Columbia) (Author)
POLICE ACADEMY 
715 McBride Blvd. New Westminster B.C. V3L 5T4 
IN SERVICE:10-8 
 
A newsletter devoted to operational police officers across British Columbia. 
 
IN MEMORIAL 
 
 
On October 6, 2002, 54-
year-old Surete du Quebec 
Corporal Antonio Arsenault 
was setting up cones to block 
off the left lane of a highway 
where a bus had broken down, 
when he was struck by an 
oncoming vehicle. Ministere des 
Transports du Quebec worker 
Jean-Yves Therrien was also hit and 
killed in the incident. Corporal 
Arseneault had served as a police 
officer for 32 years and is survived 
by his wife Jocelyne and daughter 
Julie.  
 
Corporal Arseneault’s death brings the number of 
peace officers killed in the line of duty in Canada this 
year to nine, seven of which were traffic related 
fatalities.  
 
The above information was provided with the 
permission of the Officer Down Memorial Page: 
ailable at www.odmp.org/canada av  
MANITOBA’S TOP COURT 
SANCTIONS POLICE SAFETY 
SEARCH 
R. v. Mann 2002 MBCA 121 
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concealing something hard like a weapon behind it, and 
he was not about to stop his protective search for this 
reason. At trial the accused was acquitted because the 
judge concluded that the officer had no reason other 
than perhaps curiosity to go beyond the external pat 
down search when he felt something soft. Thus, the 
search was unreasonable and the evidence was excluded 
under s.24(2) of the Charter. The Crown appealed to 
the Manitoba Court of Appeal arguing that the trial 
judge erred in holding the search unreasonable and in 
excluding the evidence.  
 
Justice Twaddle, writing for a unanimous Manitoba 
Court of Appeal, set aside the acquittal and ordered a 
new trial. Using the two-prong analysis of the 
Waterfield test (a legal analysis for determining the 
common law powers of the police adopted from the 
English case of R. v. Waterfield, [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 
(C.C.A.)) the Court concluded the police were justified 
in both detaining as well as searching the accused. 
When the police conduct constitutes a prima facie 
interference with a person's liberty or property (in 
this case the detention itself and the search that 
followed), the court must consider two questions:  
 
(1) does the police conduct fall within the general 
scope of any duty imposed by statute or 
recognized at common law; and  
 
(2) does the police conduct, albeit within the general 
scope of such a duty, involve an unjustifiable use of 
police powers associated with the duty. 
 
The Detention 
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In concluding that the police power to detain a person 
without arresting them exists under the common law 
and meets both prongs of Waterfield, Justice Twaddle 
stated: 
 
Applying the first branch of the Waterfield test to the 
case at bar, I do not think there can be any doubt that the 
temporary detention of a person who matches the 
broadcast description of someone suspected of 
involvement in a recently committed serious crime in the 
immediate neighbourhood falls within the general scope of 
the duties of a police officer to prevent crime and protect 
 life and property.  Similarly, applying the second branch of 
the test, the temporary detention of the accused for the 
limited purpose of inquiry was entirely justified by the 
similarity of the accused's appearance to the description 
of the suspect broadcast to the officers.  Indeed, it would 
have been a serious neglect of duty for the police officer 
to have permitted the accused to have walked into the 
night, so to speak, without stopping him, requesting 
identification and enquiring as to where he had come 
from.  In stopping the accused for questioning, no 
unjustifiable use of a police power was involved.  The 
detention was thus authorized by the common law. 
 
The Search 
 
In holding that the protective pat-down search also 
satisfied Waterfield and was authorized at common 
law, Justice Twaddle stated: 
 
Although the pat-down search was prima facie an 
unlawful interference with the accused's liberty, the 
search fell within the police duties to preserve the peace 
and protect life; this, because an armed detainee would 
present a threat to the public peace and to the lives of 
the police officers and any passing public.  A pat-down 
search to ensure that the detainee was unarmed was a 
justifiable use of power associated with those duties  
 
And further: 
 
[T]he pat-down search limited to a search for weapons 
was, in my view, both necessary for carrying out the 
police duties of preserving the peace, preventing crime 
and protecting life and reasonable having regard to the 
minimal infringement of the accused’s right to personal 
integrity which the pat-down search involved. Moreover, 
the public purposes of preserving peace and protecting 
life weigh more heavily on the scale than the minimal 
infringement of the accused’s right. 
 
The accused had argued that it was unreasonable for 
the officer to search inside the pouch after the item 
he initially detected by touch was soft. He submitted 
that the officer would need to feel something hard or 
which “might conceivably be a weapon” before searching 
the pouch further. Although a protective search on 
detention is limited to weapons, a search of inside 
pockets may be reasonable where the external pat-
down indicates something that may or could conceal a 
weapon. In rejecting the accused’s submission, Justice 
Twaddle concluded: 
 
[A]s we are talking about a search undertaken for safety 
reasons, it would not be reasonable to place too rigid a 
restraint on a police officer's right to ensure that the 
detainee has no weapon or other object with which he 
might cause harm to the police, himself or members of 
the public.  It is therefore my opinion that, so long as the 
court is satisfied that the search for weapons was 
conducted in good faith - and not as an excuse to search 
the detainee for evidence of a crime - the officer should 
be allowed some latitude.  In the present case, the 
officer's explanation of why he searched inside the 
pouch - "... because I feel something soft in, in the front, 
it may be hiding something hard behind, another weapon 
or anything" - strikes me as a reasonable ground for 
extending the pat-down search to a search inside the 
pouch.  There is certainly nothing to suggest that the 
officer was not acting in good faith in this regard. 
 
Although the reasoning sounds consistent with 
numerous courts, which have dealt with investigative 
detention and articulable cause, Manitoba’s top court 
directly applied the Waterfield test without 
addressing whether the officer had articulable cause 
for detaining and searching the accused.   
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
CONGRATULATIONS, YOU’VE 
DECIDED TO BE A COACH, 
NOW WHAT? 
Cst. Mike Lloyd 
 
Field coaching can be challenging, 
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In some organizations coaching 
‘comes with the job’, for others it 
may represent a stepping-stone to 
other roles or functions within the 
organization. Coaches themselves 
can often gain as much from the relationship as the new 
employee. Coaching can foster the development of new 
skills, revive some long dormant skills, and provide a 
fresh perspective on some aspects of your chosen 
profession. Let’s begin to explore this by investigating 
what coaching and mentoring is all about. 
 
Coaching Defined 
 
Coaching is the process of exerting a positive influence 
in the motivation, performance, and awareness of areas 
for improvement and development of another person to 
help them be as effective as possible. This influence is 
linked to specific, measurable objectives. 
 
Mentoring Defined 
 
Mentoring is a process of developing an interdependent 
relationship between a mentor (usually someone older) 
2
 and protégé for the purpose of helping the protégé 
learn skills and behaviours to accomplish both short and 
long term goals, which the mentor has no stake in.  
 
The Role of Coach 
 
What are the expectations that are going to be placed 
on you as a coach officer? As a coach officer you are 
expected to be a role model, teacher, and leader. As 
well, you are a way to introduce a recruit to the 
policies, procedures, and methods that your 
organization uses to conduct its business. “Role model” 
is a powerful term denoting a person that is admired 
and given special status for the abilities that they 
possess. Role models are respected, emulated, imitated, 
and even envied for the position and status that they 
hold. 
 
In the world that the new recruit is about to enter, the 
coach officer represents the portal. The recruit will 
see the occupation through the influential eyes of the 
coach officer. Why is the coach officer often held in 
such high regard? Because the coach officer has the 
practical experience that the new officer is seeking. 
The coach officer has done the job, and done it well. 
 
Some implications of being a role model  
 
A role model must lead by example, set the tone, and 
define professionalism. A role model always emphasizes 
the pursuit of excellence in all activities that they are 
involved in. Your behaviour and attitudes have a major 
influence on the individuals that you coach and 
therefore, you have to model the behaviour you wish to 
see. 
 
As a teacher you are responsible to introduce the 
individual to a vast array of new skills and information 
about the career that they are about to embark upon. 
To be an effective teacher you must know your job and 
be able to use various teaching strategies to 
communicate this information to the people you train. 
 
Author’s Bio: Cst. Mike Lloyd has been a police 
officer since 1988 and is currently working in the 
Training and Education Unit, Officer Safety Section, 
Toronto Police Service, as a use of force instructor and 
has worked as a coach officer in the past.  
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Don’t cry when it’s over. Smile because it happened” 
Author unknown. 
DETENTION ARBITRARY: 
OFFICER LACKS ARTICULABLE 
CAUSE 
R. v. Robichaud, 2002 NBCA 46 
 
A plain-clothes police officer set up 
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car in a parking lot of a Dairy Queen 
adjacent to a bowling alley because 
of an ongoing theft from vehicle 
concern. After observing several people go from the 
bowling alley to a parked black Jimmy SUV in the 
parking lot, spend a short time at, and then depart 
from the SUV, the plain-clothes officer requested a 
second officer check it. This second officer observed a 
vehicle of similar description moving through the 
parking lot approaching the roadway approximately 30 
minutes later. The officer turned around and as he 
again approached the parking lot, the driver of the SUV 
turned around and proceeded back into the lot without 
leaving it and parked in a new spot. The officer checked 
the vehicle and found the accused, who was driving, had 
a slight odour of alcohol on his breath. The accused 
submitted to a breath test on an approved screening 
device, which ultimately led to failed breathalyser 
readings and charges of impaired driving and over 
80mg%.  
 
At trial, the judge found the stop arbitrary and a 
violation of s.9 of the Charter because the officer 
lacked an articulable cause to stop the vehicle. The 
breathalyzer results were subsequently excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter. The Crown successfully 
appealed to the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench. 
Justice Riordin found the detention to be justified in 
the circumstances because the “officer had reasonable 
cause to suspect that the driver of the vehicle was 
possibly involved in illegal activity”. The detention was 
not arbitrary, was based on articulable cause, and the 
officer was “carrying out his duty to investigate 
suspected criminal activity”. The accused appealed, this 
time to the New Brunswick Court of Appeal.  
 
The Detention 
 
Although New Brunswick’s Motor Vehicle Act 
(s.15(1)(d)) allows the random stopping of motorists to 
check licence, registration, and insurance particulars, 
the officer was not using this statutory authority at 
the time of the detention. Thus, any support for a 
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 lawful detention would need to be justified at common 
law under the articulable cause doctrine. Under the 
common law, “the police power to detain a person in the 
course of an investigation for criminal activity can only 
be justified if the police officer has articulable cause 
for the detention”. Furthermore, a police officer may 
rely on hearsay to support the reasonable suspicion 
that the person is criminally involved in the activity 
under investigation. In this case, the evidence of the 
detaining officer did not support an articulable cause 
because he had only a “vague report of some activity 
around” the vehicle. Justice Larlee for the unanimous 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal stated: 
 
[The detaining officer] detained [the accused] in a parking 
lot, based on very spotty information that he had received 
from [the plain clothes officer], with the plan to check the 
vehicle for anything of suspicion. This might have been 
open liquor in the vehicle or anything in plain view that 
might have been taken from other vehicles. He wanted to 
check for suspicious activity. Bare suspicion…is not 
articulable cause. 
 
This detention took place in the parking lot adjacent to a 
bowling alley and a Dairy Queen restaurant not in an area, 
which one would normally associate with criminal activity 
such as a crack house…The black Jimmy could not be 
positively identified and the identity of the driver was 
unknown. I agree with the trial judge that [the accused’s] 
s.9 Charter rights were infringed., and the police did not 
have lawful authority at common law to detain [the 
accused]. (references omitted) 
 
Since the officer’s subsequent observations of the 
accused which lead to the approved screening device 
demand were made at a time when the accused’s s.9 
right was violated, the evidence that flowed was 
inadmissible under s.24(2) of the Charter. The 
accused’s acquittal was restored. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote  
 
“[T]he parameters under which violations of s. 9 of the 
Charter should be measured are conditioned by the 
adverb "arbitrarily" which sets the dividing line 
between detentions that violate s. 9, and those that do 
not.  That line is drawn by applying the concept of 
articulable cause which requires more than explanation 
of subjective feelings, but requires the governmental 
agent's action to be justified by reasonable objective 
criteria1”. Newfoundland Court of Appeal Justice 
Marshall 
                                                 
1 R. v. Burke (1997) 118 C.C.C. (3d) 59 (Nfld.C.A.) 
LAW OFFICE SEIZURE 
PROVISIONS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Lavallee et al. v. Canada; White et al. v. 
Canada; R. v Fink, 2002 SCC 61 
 
Three separate appeals (from 
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were brought before the Supreme 
Court of Canada arguing that the 
provisions for carrying out searches 
of law offices and seizing materials possibly protected 
by solicitor-client privilege (s.488.1 of the Criminal 
Code) violated ss.7 and 8 of the Charter. Section 488.1 
creates a procedure in which the police, after 
executing a search warrant on a law office, are 
obligated to take special steps in securing seized 
materials. When a lawyer claims that documents are 
protected by solicitor client privilege, the police must 
place them in a sealed package and turn them over to a 
court.  
 
The Attorney General, the client, or the lawyer on 
behalf of the client, then has 14 days to apply to a 
judge for an order concerning the disclosure of the 
material. The judge can inspect the documents, with 
the assistance of the Attorney General if necessary, 
and decide whether they should be disclosed. If the 
judge determines that the document is protected by 
solicitor client privilege, “the document remains 
privileged and inadmissible as evidence unless the client 
consents to its admission in evidence or the privilege is 
otherwise lost”.  
 
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (6:3) 
concluded, “s.488.1 of the Criminal 
Code…unconstitutionally jeopardizes solicitor-client 
privilege”. Solicitor–client privilege (or legal 
professional privilege) “is a rule of evidence, an 
important civil and legal right and a principle of 
fundamental justice in Canadian law” and “confidential 
communications to a lawyer represent an important 
exercise of the right to privacy, and they are central 
to the administration of justice in an adversarial 
system”. Section 488.1 “was enacted in an effort 
to…ensure that privileged communications made to a 
lawyer were properly exempted from the reach of [the 
state conducting a search of a lawyers’ business 
premise]”.  
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 Although the lawyer acts as a “gatekeeper” to the 
privilege, it is the client who owns the privilege and all 
information protected by the privilege cannot be 
accessed by the state unless the client waives it.  This 
privilege is a principle of fundamental justice in Canada 
and the client has an extremely high expectation of 
privacy in the documents in possession of their lawyer. 
Since the privilege must be as close to absolute as 
possible, the provisions of s.488.1 could only avoid 
Charter attack if they resulted in a “minimal 
impairment” of the privilege. Madame Justice Arbor, 
writing for the majority, found the provisions were 
constitutionally deficient because the privilege could be 
breached without the client’s knowledge.  
 
Since solicitor-client privilege is engaged at the time of 
communication, it does not require an affirmative 
assertion before it exists. Section 488.1 creates a 
situation where the privilege would be lost because a 
lawyer could fail to act by advancing the 
constitutionally protected right. “Therefore, s.488.1 
allows the solicitor-client confidentiality to be 
destroyed without the client’s express and informed 
authorization, and even without the client having an 
opportunity to be heard”. Furthermore, the lawyer is 
required to make the privilege claim at the time of the 
search, which would trigger the other procedural 
safeguards. The privilege belongs to the client and the 
provisions do not adequately address the entitlement 
the privilege holder has to protect their rights. In 
fact, the client may not even know the privilege is 
threatened.  
 
Jusitice Arbor went on to add that, even in cases 
where it would not be feasible to notify the client, 
independent legal intervention, such as a Law Society, 
should be involved to ensure protection of the privilege.  
Other fatal flaws to the current regime identified by 
the top court included (1) the lack of judicial discretion 
imposed by the provisions which mandate disclosure of 
the documents to the Crown in the event an application 
for privilege has not been made within the strict 
timelines and (2) the ability of the judge to request the 
assistance of the Attorney General by inspecting the 
potentially privileged document in helping to decide 
whether the material is privileged. In summary, Justice 
Arbor wrote: 
 
In short…s.488.1 fails to ensure that clients are given a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise their constitutional 
prerogative to assert or waive their privilege. Far from 
upholding solicitor-client confidentiality, s.488.1 permits 
the privilege to fall through the interstices of its 
inadequate procedure. The possible automatic loss of 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure 
through the normal operation of the law cannot be 
reasonable. Nor can the provision be infused with 
reasonableness in a constitutional sense on the basis of 
an assumption that the prosecution will behave 
honourably…if neither the client nor the lawyer has 
[initiated a review of the documents], or refrain from 
exercising the right to inspect the sealed documents, 
even though authorized to do so by the reviewing judge… 
 
In concluding that s.488.1 violated s.8 of the Charter 
and could not be saved by s.1, the majority of the Court 
refused to read in or severe the existing law and 
suggested Parliament carefully redraft the legislation. 
They did however, provide general common law 
principles that would govern law office searches until 
Parliament completes its task: 
 
• "No search warrant can be issued with regards to 
documents that are known to be protected by 
solicitor-client privilege. 
 
• "Before searching a law office, the investigative 
authorities must satisfy the issuing justice that 
there exists no other reasonable alternative to the 
search. 
 
• "When allowing a law office to be searched, the 
issuing justice must be rigorously demanding so to 
afford maximum protection of solicitor-client 
confidentiality. 
 
• "Except when the warrant specifically authorizes 
the immediate examination, copying and seizure of 
an identified document, all documents in possession 
of a lawyer must be sealed before being examined 
or removed from the lawyer's possession. 
 
• "Every effort must be made to contact the lawyer 
and the client at the time of the execution of the 
search warrant. Where the lawyer or the client 
cannot be contacted, a representative of the Bar 
should be allowed to oversee the sealing and 
seizure of documents. 
 
• "The investigative officer executing the warrant 
should report to the Justice of the Peace the 
efforts made to contact all potential privilege 
holders, who should then be given a reasonable 
opportunity to assert a claim of privilege and, if 
that claim is contested, to have the issue judicially 
decided. 
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 • "If notification of potential privilege holders is not 
possible, the lawyer who had custody of the 
documents seized, or another lawyer appointed 
either by the Law Society or by the court, should 
examine the documents to determine whether a 
claim of privilege should be asserted, and should be 
given a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
 
• "The Attorney General may make submissions on 
the issue of privilege, but should not be permitted 
to inspect the documents beforehand. The 
prosecuting authority can only inspect the 
documents if and when it is determined by a judge 
that the documents are not privileged. 
 
• "Where sealed documents are found not to be 
privileged, they may be used in the normal course 
of the investigation. 
 
• "Where documents are found to be privileged, they 
are to be returned immediately to the holder of 
the privilege, or to a person designated by the 
court. 
 
A Different View  
 
Although the minority agreed s.488.1(4) allowing the 
prosecution (Attorney General) to read the documents 
while assisting the reviewing judge violated the 
Charter, the three dissenting justices concluded that 
s.488.1 could “be interpreted in a manner that 
comports with constitutional guarantees by 
assuming…that lawyers will discharge their obligations 
to their clients in a manner which reflects their status 
as…officers of the court, and…as independent 
professionals playing a key function in the life of the 
Canadian legal system”. In their opinion, s.488.1 
provided “reasonable and adequate safeguards against 
illegal searches or seizure and actually protected 
solicitor-client privilege, not destroy it”. Justice Louis 
LeBel stated:   
 
[T]he picture of lawyers and staff passively standing by 
while the police rummage through the firm's files, seizing 
them and carting them away, appears highly hypothetical, 
to say the least. Even the most incompetent lawyer or 
the most absent-minded legal assistant or law clerk would 
not confuse a squad of RCMP or Sûreté du Québec 
officers armed with a search warrant, barging into the 
reception room, with the pizza man. In any firm, large or 
small, this kind of event should ring a few bells and 
trigger some kind of a response. A reasonably competent 
lawyer should be expected to realize that a question of 
privilege could arise, that he or she would need to review 
some or all of the files sought by the police and should 
make a claim of privilege where necessary. 
 
The minority concluded that, with the exception of the 
prosecution assisting the judge in viewing the 
documents, s.488.1 satisfied the requirements of s.8 of 
the Charter in protecting persons from unreasonable 
search and seizure. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
HEARING DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
Pointon v. Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles, 2002 BCCA 516 
 
A police officer followed the 
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the driveway of his residence, and 
subsequently observed signs of 
impairment. As a consequence, the 
ppellant provided samples of his breath that indicated 
 blood alcohol content of 160mg% and 170mg% and he 
as served with a 90-day administrative driving 
rohibition under s.94.1 of British Columbia’s Motor 
ehicle Act (the Act). Under s.94.4 of the Act, the 
ppellant applied for a review and submitted affidavit 
vidence on his behalf, but the adjudicator confirmed 
he prohibition.  
he appellant brought further proceedings under the 
udicial Review Procedures Act seeking an order 
evoking the original prohibition as well as quashing its 
onfirmation. The Supreme Court of British Columbia 
udge hearing this petition rejected the appellant’s 
equest, but ordered a new review hearing. At the 
econd review hearing however, the adjudicator again 
onfirmed the prohibition. Once again he filed a 
etition under the Judicial Review Procedures Act, 
hich was rejected by a Supreme Court judge. The 
ppellant further appealed to the British Columbia 
ourt of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that he 
as denied procedural fairness because he was not 
rovided an opportunity at the hearing to cross-
xamine the police officer who issued the prohibition 
or the technician who conducted the breathalyser 
ests.  
ection 94.5 of the Act allows the adjudicator to 
onsider any sworn or solemnly affirmed statements, 
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 the report of the police officer issuing the prohibition, 
a copy of the certificate of analysis, and, in the case of 
oral hearing, any relevant evidence given or 
representations made (s.94.5(1)(d)). In concluding that 
the hearing is a judicial or quasi-judicial process and 
not simply an administrative inquiry as the 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles suggested, Justice 
Lambert for the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
stated: 
 
The hearing is conducted by someone who has come to be 
called an adjudicator.  The hearing contemplates a process 
of reasoning, leading to a conclusion based on evidence.  It 
permits an oral hearing and if there is an oral hearing it 
requires that the additional relevant evidence given at the 
oral hearing must be considered.  Most important, the oral 
hearing contemplates the weighing of the evidence and the 
making of findings of credibility on the road to balancing 
the evidence and reaching a conclusion on blood alcohol 
content. 
 
Cross-examination is a crucial part to both the weighing 
of evidence and assessing its credibility. The 
administrative driving prohibition legislation does not 
exclude the right to cross-examine the police officer 
or breathalyser technician at the oral hearing, if it is 
requested and a proper foundation has been laid. A 
proper foundation for cross-examination can be laid by 
contradicting the evidence of the police and then by 
stating the basis upon which the police evidence is 
being contradicted. As a remedy, the Court revoked 
the administrative driving prohibition and quashed its 
confirmation.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
POLICE ACADEMY OFFERS 
CAREER DEVELOPMENT 
COURSES 
 
 
 
In order to meet the needs of 
police agencies and individual 
member’s career goals, the Police 
Academy is launching a new 
program of Career Development 
Courses for police officers. 
Initially, a limited selection of Career Development 
Courses will be offered to police agencies and to 
individual police members on a cost recovery, fee-for-
service basis.  
 
The courses offered are selected from the Academy’s 
Advanced Police Training curriculum and its Contract 
Law Enforcement Program and will provide candidates 
with practical knowledge and skills that will benefit the 
candidate’s agency and will assist individuals to achieve 
their career goals. Many of the courses will provide 
accreditation toward a Police Sciences diploma or 
degree. 
 
Service Increments 
 
The Academy recommends that police agencies 
consider, where applicable, applying the successful 
completion of a Career Development Course toward 
service pay increment qualification.  However, this is 
solely an interagency matter to which the Justice 
Institute is not a party. The Academy will make course 
outlines and course training standards available to 
police agencies upon request. 
 
Registration 
 
Since the Career Development Course program must be 
financially self-sufficient, it may be necessary to 
cancel any course where there are too few candidates 
registered to ensure the economic viability of the 
program.  For that purpose the Academy has instituted 
the following registration policies: 
 
Who may register 
 
1. Career Development Course seats are offered only 
to recognized police agencies and to individuals who 
are serving members of a recognized police agency. 
2. All candidates must pay the registration fees at 
the time of registration.  
 
Late Registration 
 
3. Registration will not be accepted while a course is 
in progress without the approval of the instructor 
and with permission in writing granted by the 
Program Director – Police Training Services. Under 
no circumstances will registration fees be pro-
rated. 
 
Withdrawal by a candidate 
 
4. Registered candidates may withdraw from a course 
in which they are registered and receive a full 
refund provided the withdrawal occurs at least 7 
calendar days prior to course commencement. 
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 Course cancellation 
 
5. The Academy may cancel any course at least 30 
calendar days prior to its commencement. 
6. A full refund of fees will be provided upon course 
cancellation 
7. Where a course has not been cancelled, 
registration will remain open until the 
commencement of the course or until all seats are 
filled.  
 
COURSE OFFERINGS 
 
Intro to Criminal Intelligence 
Evaluation Percentage: 
Complete the activities at the end of each topic, the 
syndicate practicum and the Work Book contained in 
the Assessment Module.  A 100% pass mark is required. 
 
Tactical Surveillance Course 
POL 646 
February 17-21, 2002 
0800– 1600 hrs. days 1,2,3 &5 
1200– 2000 hrs. day 4 
 
Location:  Justice Institute of BC, 715 McBride Blvd. 
New Westminster, BC 
 POL 636  
December 2-4, 2002 
0800– 1800 hrs 
 
Location:  Justice Institute of BC, 715 McBride Blvd. 
New Westminster, BC 
 
Fees:  $195.00     
 
Course Length: 3 days (10 hours in class per day) + 10 
hours practical exercises and a work-book.      
 
Instructor: Mr. Peter Bell 
Peter has been a practicing intelligence analyst for the 
past decade. He is currently employed as an intelligence 
analyst with the Organized Crime Agency of British 
Columbia. Peter served as a police officer in Australia 
for 15 years before retiring at the rank of Detective 
Sergeant in 1998. Between 1998 and 2000, Peter 
served as the National Intelligence Training 
Coordinator with the Australian Bureau of Criminal 
Intelligence and then as the Senior Strategic 
Intelligence Analyst with the Australian Federal Police. 
Peter holds a Masters in Education and is approaching 
the completion of a Doctoral thesis in the same 
discipline. He has developed and delivered intelligence 
training programs throughout Australia, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, the Middle East, and much of Southeast 
Asia. 
 
Prerequisites:  
Candidates must be members of an accredited police 
agency. 
 
Texts and Equipment:  
The instructor will provide: subject outline; book of 
readings; study guide; assessment module – workbook 
 
Method of Course Delivery:  
Lecture, class discussion, exercises 
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ourse Length: 5 days   
nstructor: Detective Bill Hudson  
ill has been an operational police officer for over 20 
ears with extensive experience in surveillance. He has 
nstructed this Academy course for the past 8 years 
nd is highly acclaimed as a presenter and provides a 
rogram that is current and relevant to the needs of 
odern police investigators. 
rerequisites:  
andidates must be members of an accredited police 
gency and hold a valid drivers license. 
exts and Equipment:  
he Academy will provide all manuals, vehicles, video 
ameras, and radios. 
ethod of Course Delivery:  
ecture, demonstration, and simulation scenarios 
nvolving foot and vehicle surveillance. 
valuation Percentage: 
omplete the practice scenarios. Exam - minimum pass 
rade – 70% 
or further inquiries contact: 
.E. (Dave) Pawson, Advanced Training Coordinator  
ustice Institute of British Columbia - Police Academy 
15 McBride Blvd. 
ew Westminster, BC  
3L 5T4  
ffice: (604) 528-5530 
ax:   (604) 528-5754 e-mail: dpawson@jibc.bc.ca 
heck our website at www.jibc.bc.ca 
 
earning Together for Safer Communities 
8
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 ASKING ABOUT DRUGS 
EXCEEDS SCOPE OF SAFETY 
SEARCH 
R. v. Wood, 2002 MBPC 10021 
 
The police received a complaint from 
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to its location. Thus, “the police were entitled in these 
circumstances to briefly detain the accused to pursue 
their investigation”. 
 
The Search 
 
In deciding whether the police were entitled to search 
the accused, the Court concluded that a search was 
V
Oa woman that her boyfriend stole 
her cat and traded it to the accused 
in exchange for some drugs, which 
the police were able to confirm 
fter interviewing the boyfriend at his residence. 
hile exiting the boyfriend’s home, the police by 
hance spotted, stopped, and questioned the accused. 
he accused told the officers he had accepted the cat 
or drugs and that he would direct the police to its 
ocation. The police advised the two men there would be 
o charges if the cat was located. Before the two men 
ntered the police car for the drive to the accused’s 
ome, an officer asked whether they had any weapons 
r drugs on them. The accused, in response to the 
uestion, produced a receptacle containing marihuana 
oaches, a marihuana cigarette, a pipe, and a pair of 
cissors. The accused was charged with possession of 
arihuana, but argued that the drugs were discovered 
s a result of an arbitrary detention and an 
nreasonable search or seizure. Furthermore, the 
ccused submitted he was not informed of his right to 
ounsel upon detention as required by s.10(b) of the 
harter.  
anitoba Provincial Court Justice Chartier concluded 
hat “police officers have in certain circumstances, the 
ight to detain a person for investigation of a criminal 
ffence and to search that person for weapons to 
rotect their safety during the detention” if (1) the 
fficer is acting in the course of their duties, (2) the 
fficer has an articulable cause to justify the 
etention, and (3) the detention and subsequent search 
re reasonably necessary.  
he Detention 
n this case, the officers were acting in the course of 
heir duties. They were responding to a complaint of a 
tolen cat being traded for drugs and the investigation 
ed to the accused, who was suspected of receiving the 
tolen cat. The officers also possessed the requisite 
rticulable cause upon which to justify the detention. 
he accused told the officers that he had received the 
at in exchange for drugs and that he could lead them 
justified if conducted only for safety reasons: 
 
The evidence before the court was that [the accused] 
was involved in the drug trade and as the officers knew 
this, it was certainly reasonable to believe he may be 
armed. To ensure officer safety, [the accused] was asked 
if he was armed. Under these circumstances I am of the 
view that [the accused] could be lawfully searched to 
ensure officer safety. 
 
However, the police also asked the accused whether he 
had any drugs on his person. Their own evidence was 
that they did not have reasonable grounds to believe he 
had any drugs on him or that drugs were important for 
officer safety. Since a search incidental to 
investigative detention is a search for weapons only, 
not contraband, the question concerning drugs went 
beyond the scope of a safety search and should not 
have been asked. Justice Chartier stated: 
 
In this case, the police officers had no grounds to ask 
[the accused] whether he had drugs on his person and I 
cannot accept that he consented to producing the drugs 
or that he was aware of the potential consequences of 
voluntarily producing the drugs. I therefore am of the 
view that there was a breach of s.10(b) of the Charter. 
 
Admissibility of Evidence 
 
Despite finding that the accused’s rights under the 
Charter were violated, the evidence was nonetheless 
admitted. Since the police were entitled to search the 
accused for safety even if he had not produced the 
items when asked, the drugs would have been found in 
any event during the search for weapons. The officers 
acted in good faith and admitting the evidence would 
not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org  
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“'Violence' implies action which is thoughtless, random 
and without consideration. 'Use of Force' implies action 
that is purposeful, considered and rehearsed. Violence 
never solves anything. The Use of Force has resolved 
more conflict in human history than everything else 
altogether”. Vancouver Police Constable John Irving 
olume 2 Issue 10 
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 RESISTING UNJUSTIFIED 
DETENTION REASONABLE 
R. v. Rankine, 
[2002] O.J. No. 3081 (OntCJ) 
 
 A police officer driving through a 
parking lot of a shopping plaza 
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lawful execution of his duty. Moreover, the search was 
unreasonable as it was not incident to a lawful arrest. 
The drug evidence was excluded.  
 
INTENTION TO DRIVE NOT 
NECESSARY FOR DEFACTO 
CARE & CONTROL 
V
Onotorious for drug trafficking and 
drug use observed the accused, a 
known drug dealer. The officer, who 
as not investigating an offence at the time nor have 
easonable grounds to arrest the accused, approached 
im and attempted to engage him in conversation about 
 topic the officer could not remember at trial. The 
fficer testified that the accused did nothing wrong, 
ad not been seen talking or transacting with anyone, 
ad not made any phone calls, did not have a warrant 
or his arrest, nor did he try any doors of parked cars. 
s he came along side the accused, the officer 
bserved that he was fidgety and uncomfortable, and 
urned and ran away. The officer yelled at the accused 
o stop, pursued him, and grabbed his arm. After the 
ccused twisted and punched the officer in the chest 
everal times, he was subdued, handcuffed, and 
earched. As a result of the search, the police found 
arihuana, scales, cash, and a cell phone. The accused 
as charged with assaulting a peace officer in the 
awful execution of his duty and possession of 
arihuana for the purpose of trafficking.  
awful Execution of Duty? 
he Ontario Court of Justice found the officer was not 
n the lawful execution of his duty. The officer did not 
ave reasonable grounds to arrest the accused at the 
ime he grabbed him nor did he have an articulable 
ause to justify a detention under the common law. The 
fficer was not engaged in any criminal investigation 
nvolving the accused or anyone else. Justice 
dmondstone stated: 
[The officer’s] only reason for detaining [the accused] 
was his knowledge of the area and of [the accused’s] 
background and fidgety manner and running when the 
officer attempted to converse with him about some topic 
that the officer cannot recall. He had in my view no more 
than suspicions… 
ince the officer was neither justified in arresting or 
etaining the accused, it was not unreasonable for him 
o punch the officer to get away. Thus, the accused 
as not guilty of assaulting a peace officer in the 
R. v Brahnuik, 2002 SKCA 104 
 
The police responded to a complaint 
olume 2 Issue 10 
ctober/November 2002 about the grossly inebriated accused 
entering his truck, starting it, and 
going to sleep across the bench seat in 
the parking lot of a bar. Police officers 
found his vehicle with the engine running, windows up, 
doors locked, and the accused slumped across the seat 
with his buttocks in front of the steering wheel, his 
feet on the floor by the operator’s pedals, and his head 
towards the passenger door. After several attempts to 
arouse him, the police eventually were able to enter the 
truck and have him exit. At the police station, the 
accused subsequently provided samples of his breath 
which resulted in readings of 190mg% and 170mg%. The 
accused was charged with care and control while 
impaired and over 80mg%. At trial, the accused 
submitted that when he left the bar he was too 
intoxicated to walk, got into his truck, started it up to 
stay warm, and went to sleep. He testified he had no 
intention to drive the vehicle and argued that he was 
not in care and control.   
 
Care and control of a motor vehicle can either be 
established by the statutory Criminal Code presumption 
or by proving actual non-presumptive, or defacto, care 
and control. Section 258(1)(a) of the Code creates a 
presumption that the person occupying the driver’s 
seat is deemed to have care and control of a motor 
vehicle, unless they prove they did not occupy it for 
the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion (driving). 
Although the trial judge found the accused occupied 
the driver’s seat, he successfully rebutted the 
presumption by testifying that he entered the truck to 
sleep, not to drive. Defacto care and control is defined 
as “acts which involve some use of the car or its 
fittings and equipment, or some course of conduct 
associated with the vehicle which would involve a risk 
of putting the vehicle in motion so that it could become 
dangerous2”. In convicting the accused of care and 
control with a blood alcohol content in excess of 
11
                                                 
2 See R. v. Brahnuik, [2001] S.J. No. 816 (SPC) 
 80mg%, Saskatchewan Provincial Court Judge 
Nightingale stated: 
 
…I find…that [the accused] had actual care and control 
of the truck. I am satisfied that he possessed the 
immediate ability to set the vehicle in motion had he 
woken up, since it was running and in no way disabled. 
Indeed, the drunken, uncoordinated movements he made 
in response to the police commands to unlock the truck 
doors suggest strongly that he could easily have set the 
vehicle in motion through inadvertence. This set of 
circumstances establishes the actus reus of care and 
control. The mens rea is made out on the usual 
presumption that a person intends the logical 
consequences of their actions, demonstrated here by 
turning on the ignition and locking the doors; this shows 
an intent to exercise care and control of the truck and 
its fittings. 
 
On appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s 
Bench, his conviction was overturned. Court of Queen’s 
Bench Justice Dielschneider was of the view that 
simply because a person is in a position to use the 
vehicle or its fittings and equipment at some future 
time does not establish the necessary “control” 
required for the actus reus. The Crown appealed, this 
time to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. Justice 
Gerwing, for the unanimous appeal court, restored the 
conviction. Although the trial judge accepted that the 
accused had no intention to drive, his finding of actual 
care and control was consistent with the Supreme 
Court of Canada and Saskatchewan law. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“I am not unmindful of the difficulties that sometimes 
face police officers. I am acutely conscious that our 
police forces perform an essential function in 
sometimes difficult and frequently dangerous 
circumstances. The police must not be officiously or 
unduly hampered in the performance of that duty. That 
is not a hollow piety; it is the law… They must 
frequently act hurriedly and react to sudden 
emergencies. Their actions must therefore be 
considered in the light of the circumstances… The 
performance of a policeman's duty is frequently 
attended with risk to others. But he is not liable to 
others for injury caused by the performance of duty if 
he acts reasonably”3. Ontario High Court of Justice 
Reid  
                                                 
3 Prior v. McNab (1976) 16 O.R. (2d) 380 (H.Ct.) 
OFFICER HAD MORE THAN A 
DESIRE TO SATISFY 
CURIOSITY 
R. v. Tomtene, 2002 SKQB 280 
 
At 2:00 am. a police officer of a 
Volume 2 Issue 10 
October/November 2002 rural detachment observed a vehicle 
approaching a highway from a farm 
field. The officer was aware of 
numerous complaints during seeding 
season from area farmers who had batteries, tools, and 
fuel stolen from their seeding equipment left in the 
fields at night. The officer stopped the vehicle and 
noted an open bottle of beer on the dash and a partial 
case of beer behind the front seat. The accused had an 
odour of liquor on his breath, his speech was slurred, 
and his eyes were bloodshot. He was arrested, 
Chartered, and transported to the detachment for 
breathalyser tests which consequently resulted in 
readings of 220mg% and 210mg%. The accused was 
subsequently convicted of care and control while over 
80mg%. The accused appealed his conviction to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench arguing that the 
police officer did not have reasonable grounds to stop 
the vehicle, thus violating his s.9 Charter right to be 
free from arbitrary detention.  
 
Although Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic Act 
authorizes a police officer in the execution of their 
duties to require a person to stop their vehicle, the 
officer was not stopping him for any traffic related 
purpose. However, Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s 
Bench Justice Matheson noted that the common law 
allows police officers to stop persons where there is 
reasonable cause to suspect (a constellation of 
objectively discernible facts) that the detainee is 
criminally implicated in the activity under investigation. 
The basis for such a detention must result from more 
than a hunch or desire to satisfy curiosity.  
 
12
Although case law does not state exactly how many 
facts are required for “reasonable cause to suspect”, it 
does require “more than one “fact””. In this case, the 
officer observed the accused’s vehicle at 2:00 am. 
during spring seeding time driving on a farm field about 
to exit onto a highway and knew of numerous complaints 
from farmers during spring seeding time of thefts 
from their fields. Considering these facts, Justice 
Matheson found that “it is quite impossible to conclude 
that they do not form a reasonable basis for suspicion 
 of involvement in criminal activity”. Thus, the detention 
was not arbitrary and the appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
FACT or FICTION? 
 
 
A Charlotte North 
Carolina lawyer 
purchased a box of 
very rare and 
expensive cigars, then 
insured them against 
unacceptable fire (among other things). Within the 
month, having smoked his entire stockpile of these 
great cigars, and not yet having made even his first 
premium payment on the insurance policy, the lawyer 
filed a claim against the insurance company. In his 
claim, the lawyer stated the cigars were lost “in a 
series of small fires”. The insurance company 
refused to pay, citing the obvious reason: the man 
consumed the cigars in the normal fashion. The 
lawyer sued…and won! 
 
 
In delivering the ruling, 
the judge agreed with the 
insurance company that 
the claim was frivolous. 
However, the judge stated 
that the cigars were 
insurable and that the 
insurance company had guaranteed that it would 
indeed insure them against fire---without defining 
what is considered “unacceptable fire”---and was 
obligated to pay the claim. Rather than endure a 
lengthy and costly appeal process, the insurance 
company accepted the ruling and paid $15,000 to the 
lawyer for his incendiary bamboozle.  
 
After the lawyer cashed the cheque, the insurance 
company had him arrested on 24 counts of ARSON! 
With his own insurance claim and testimony from the 
previous case being used against him, the lawyer was 
convicted of intentionally burning his insured 
property and sentenced to 24 months in jail and a 
$24,000 fine4!!! A beautiful legal system at work. 
                                                 
4 This information was received as an unsolicited e-mail and claimed to be a true 
story. Apparently the story was the 1st place winner in a recent criminal lawyers 
award contest. 
MANITOBA COURT OF APPEAL 
UPHOLDS RANDOM, ROVING 
VEHICLE STOPS 
R. v. Powroznik, 2002 MBCA 110 
 
A police officer randomly stopped 
the accused driving. An odour of 
liquor led to a failed roadside 
screening test and subsequent failed 
breathalyzer tests. The accused was 
convicted at trial of over 80mg% and Crown entered a 
stay of proceedings on the impaired driving charge. The 
accused successfully appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Queen’s bench by arguing that the stop was not 
authorized at common law because it was not part of an 
organized stationary check stop programme to identify 
drinking drivers, but was more akin to a roving, random 
stop5. Since the officer did not have an articulable 
cause for the stop (a requirement of the common law), 
Justice Beard found the detention arbitrary and in 
violation of the accused’s rights under s.9 of the 
Charter. The matter was referred back to the trial 
judge to determine whether the breathalyser evidence 
should be excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter.  
 
The Crown then appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing that Manitoba’s Highway Traffic Act 
(HTA) authorizes the random and arbitrary stopping of 
motorists, regardless of whether there is an organized 
programme or not. Section 76.1 of the HTA permits a 
police officer in the execution of their duties to stop a 
motor vehicle.  
 
s.76.1 Highway Traffic Act 
A peace officer, in the lawful execution of his or her duties 
and responsibilities, may require the driver of a motor vehicle 
to stop, and the driver of the motor vehicle, when signalled or 
requested to stop by a peace officer who is readily 
identifiable as such, shall immediately come to a safe stop and 
remain stopped until permitted by the peace officer to 
depart. 
 
Justice Philp, for the unanimous Manitoba Court of 
Appeal, concluded that the power to randomly stop 
motorists derived from s.76.1 was a valid and 
constitutional legislative enactment that, although 
permitting arbitrary detentions, was saved by the 
justificatory analysis in s.1 of the Charter. The 
accused’s conviction was restored. 
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Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
                                                 
5 See 2002 MBQB 131 
 Editor’s Note: Although a detention will be considered 
arbitrary when it is made without “articulable cause”6, 
the random and therefore arbitrary stopping of 
motorists, sometimes referred to as “cherry picking”7 
or “routine checks”8, may be permissible either at 
common law or under the authority of statute. For 
example, in British Columbia s.73(1) of the Motor 
Vehicle Act authorizes the arbitrary stopping of 
motorists: 
 
s.73(1) Motor Vehicle Act 
A peace officer may require the driver of a motor vehicle to 
stop and the driver of a motor vehicle, when signalled or 
requested to stop by a peace officer who is readily 
identifiable as a peace officer, must immediately come to a 
safe stop. 
 
Similarly, in Alberta, s.119 of the Highway Traffic Act 
justifies random vehicle stops: 
 
s.119 Highway Traffic Act 
A driver of a vehicle shall, immediately on being signalled or 
requested to stop by a peace officer in uniform, bring that 
vehicle to a stop and furnish any information respecting the 
driver or the vehicle that the peace officer requires and shall 
not start that vehicle until the driver is permitted to do so by 
the peace officer. 
 
While in Ontario, it is s.216(1) of the Highway Traffic 
Act: 
 
s. 216 (1) Highway Traffic Act 
A police officer, in the lawful execution of his or her duties 
and responsibilities, may require the driver of a motor vehicle 
to stop and the driver of a motor vehicle, when signalled or 
requested to stop by a police officer who is readily 
identifiable as such, shall immediately come to a safe stop.   
 
In Quebec, s.636 of the Highway Safety Code justifies 
arbitrary detentions: 
 
s.636 Highway Safety Code 
Every peace officer recognizable as such at first sight may, in 
the performance of his duties under this Code and the Act 
respecting owners and operators of heavy vehicles (chapter P-
30.3), require the driver of a road vehicle to stop his vehicle. 
The driver must comply with this requirement without delay. 
 
Although permitting arbitrary detentions, these sections 
are justified under s.1 of the Charter as a reasonable 
limit to be free from arbitrary detention9. However, the 
detention of the motorist must be rationally connected10 
and limited to highway traffic matters and must be 
brief, unless other grounds are established to justify 
further detention11. Legitimate purposes related to 
enforcing driving laws and traffic safety include: 
                                                 
6 R. v. Griffin (1996) 111 C.C.C. (3d) 490 (Nfld.C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [1997] 
S.C.C.A. No. 32 
7 R. v. Del Ben [2000] O.J. No. 812 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
8 R. v. Calder [2002] O.J. No. 3021 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
9 R. v. Wilson (1993) 86 C.C.C. (3d) 145 (B.C.C.A.), see also R. v. Ladouceur (1990) 56 
C.C.C. (3d) 22 (S.C.C.), R. v. Hufsky [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621,  
10 R. v. Del Ben [2000] O.J. No. 812 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
 
¾ producing documents drivers are by law required to 
possess such as driver’s licences and insurance12 
and checking those documents against information 
available on CPIC13 
¾ assessing the mechanical fitness of a vehicle14 
¾ checking the sobriety of drivers15 
 
When the justification for continued detention is 
neither related to the original purpose nor based on an 
articulable cause of other unlawful activity, any 
prolonged detention becomes arbitrary.  
 
Random stops are also justified under the common law 
only if they are conducted as part of an organized 
program, such as an advertised drinking driving 
campaign16. Random, roving stops however, where the 
officer has the sole discretion on whether to stop 
motorists, are not justified at common law.  
 
Thus, in those provinces that do not have statutory 
authority permitting the arbitrary stopping of 
motorists, the police cannot randomly stop vehicles 
unless they are detaining them as part of an organized 
program. All other stops must have, at minimum, an 
articulable cause justifying the detention. For example, 
Newfoundland traffic legislation requires objective 
(reasonable) criteria justifying the stop17: 
 
s.162 Highway Traffic Act  
Where a traffic officer reasonably considers it necessary…(d) 
to stop a motor vehicle on a highway to ensure that this Act 
and the regulations are being complied with, the officer may 
direct traffic according to his or her discretion, 
notwithstanding anything in this Part, and every person shall 
obey the officer's directions. 
 
                                                 
11 Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force (1998) 43 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. 
J.R. [2000] O.J. No. 930 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
12 R. v. Ladouceur [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 at p.1287, R. v. Wilson (1993) 86 C.C.C. (3d) 
145 (B.C.C.A.). 
13 Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force (1998) 43 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont.C.A.) 
14 R. v. Ladouceur [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 at p.1287, Brown v. Durham Regional Police 
Force (1998) 43 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont.C.A.), 
15 R. v. Ladouceur [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 at p.1287, R. v. Wilson (1993) 86 C.C.C. (3d) 
145 (B.C.C.A.) 
16 R. v. Griffin (1996) 111 C.C.C. (3d) 490 (Nfld.C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [1997] 
S.C.C.A. No. 32 
17 R. v. Griffin (1996) 111 C.C.C. (3d) 490 (Nfld.C.A.) appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [1997] 
S.C.C.A. No. 32 
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 DRUG ‘INDICATORS’ PROVIDE 
ARTICULABLE CAUSE:  
DETENTION & SEARCH 
JUSTIFIED 
R. v. Calderon & Stalas,  
(2002) Court File No. 01-0107 (OntSCJ) 
 
An OPP officer, who had attended a 
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As he exited, the officer detected a fresh odour of 
marihuana from the interior of the car.  
 
Shortly after commencing the search, the officer 
heard the driver say, “Don’t let the police search the 
vehicle”. The passenger then withdrew his consent. 
However, since the officer had already detected an 
odour of marihuana, he concluded he had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the occupants for possession of 
marihuana and continued the search despite the 
withdrawal of permission. Although he did not find any 
V
Odrug interdiction course, was on 
night shift with his partner when 
they observed a large 2000 Lincoln 
automobile with B.C. licence plates 
ravelling 10 km/h over the speed limit. The licence 
late was queried on CPIC and the officers learned the 
egistered owner was Budget Car and Truck Rentals in 
ritish Columbia. The vehicle was stopped and police 
bserved two duffle bags and an open road map on the 
ack seat, food rappers on the floor, a cell phone 
etween the two occupants who did not appear to fit 
he expensive car, and a pager. Another cell phone was 
een in the glove box when it was opened to obtain the 
ental agreement.  
t the drug interdiction course the officer had learned 
hat “indicators” of a drug courier included: driving a 
arge size, late model rental car to avoid the financial 
oss if it is seized; a large trunk providing space for 
ontraband; the presence of road maps consistent with 
 driver wanting to know where they are going; fast 
ood wrappers suggesting the occupants stay with the 
ar because of drugs; and cell phones and pagers used 
o communicate with clients of the courier. Since many 
f the indicators were present during the vehicle stop, 
he officer’s focus shifted from speeding to drug 
etection.  
he driver was asked to step from the vehicle and 
sked if he would mind opening the truck. The driver 
tated he knew his privacy rights and did not want the 
olice looking in the car. The officer then approached 
he passenger, who remained seated in the car, and 
sked him if there was any drugs, guns, or tobacco in 
he vehicle. The passenger was asked if he would mind 
he police searching the car and was told that if 
nything illegal were found he would be charged and 
hat he could withdraw his consent at any time. The 
assenger said, “Sure, go ahead and look”. The 
assenger was asked to stand at the front of the car. 
marihuana in the interior of the car, the officer opened 
the trunk and found two duffle bags containing 40 lbs. 
of packaged marihuana. The driver and passenger were 
arrested and charged with possession of marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking under s.5(2) of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.  
 
At trial, the accused argued, in part, that their rights 
under ss.8, and 9 of the Charter were violated. They 
submitted that stopping them for speeding was merely 
an excuse to conduct a drug investigation and had the 
effect of an arbitrary detention. Further, the search 
of the car was unlawful and therefore unreasonable. 
Thus, as a consequence of the Charter breaches, the 
evidence should be excluded under s.24(2). The Crown 
argued that there were no Charter violations and that 
the police had articulable cause for the detention and 
further, that the resultant search was reasonable. 
 
The Detention 
 
In summarizing the law of investigative detention, 
Ontario Superior Court Justice Kurisko stated: 
 
Where an individual is detained by the police in the 
course of efforts to determine whether that individual is 
involved in criminal activity being investigated by the 
police, that detention can only be justified if the 
detaining officer has some "articulable cause" for the 
detention, namely a constellation of objectively 
discernible facts which give the detaining officer 
reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is 
criminally implicated in the activity under 
investigation.  The standard for reasonable suspicion is 
less demanding than that for reasonable belief and can 
arise from information that is less reliable than that 
required to show reasonable belief.  A reasonable 
suspicion of the possibility of a crime is sufficient. 
    
The courts must act as the gatekeeper regulating the 
police power for investigatory detention so that street 
detentions do not end up being non-stationhouse 
incommunicado arrests.  Each case depends on its own 
facts.  The constellation of facts and circumstances must 
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 be viewed as a whole, rather than isolating each in 
turn.  The inquiry into the existence of an articulable 
cause is the first step in the determination of whether 
the detention was justified in the totality of the 
circumstances.  The next step is to determine whether 
the investigatory action of the police (in this case, the 
search of the Lincoln) was justified and therefore 
reasonable. 
 
If there is articulable cause that justifies the detention 
and the search, the detention is not arbitrary, the search 
is not unreasonable and there is no breach of s. 8 or s. 9 
of the Charter. (emphasis added) 
 
And further: 
 
[T]he thread running through the [investigative detention 
and articulable cause] cases is the prerequisite principle 
that, viewing the facts and circumstances as a whole 
rather than isolating each in turn, the court must be 
satisfied there is a bona fide, clearly expressed and 
factually objective reason justifying not only the 
detention of the suspect but also the extent and nature 
of the investigation.  Intuition and hunches confirmed by 
hindsight are not acceptable.  
 
The accused argued that the so called “indicators” 
(fast food wrappers, an open map in a car, cell phones, 
and a late model rental car) were “clearly consistent 
with innocent vehicular traffic” and did not provide an 
objective basis amounting to an articulable cause for 
the drug investigation. Furthermore, the indicators 
were purely subjective, the detention was arbitrary, 
and if the court was to accept their validity, it would 
be recognizing a recipe for the arbitrary detention of 
any motorist. Moreover, the officers testified they had 
never found drugs in over 60 drug investigation stops, 
which, as the accused argued, demonstrated the 
inaccuracy and unreasonableness of the indicators.  
 
Despite the accused’s argument, the Court concluded 
that the police had the statutory power to stop the 
accused for speeding and that the continued detention 
for the drug investigation was based upon an articulable 
cause. Justice Kurisko stated:  
 
Section 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act authorizes 
the stopping of vehicles for what may be broadly 
described as highway regulation and safety 
purposes.  …  Where the police have highway traffic 
concerns and other unrelated concerns, then the limit on 
their conduct should be imposed by limiting their conduct 
after the stop so long as the other purposes motivating 
the stop are not themselves improper.   
 
Stopping the Lincoln for speeding was legitimately 
connected to a highway safety concern.  The fact that 
[the officer] suspected there was a possibility of drugs 
did not taint the lawfulness of the stop.  The lawfulness 
of the subsequent investigative detention for drugs 
depends on whether there was articulable cause. 
 
Counsel for the defendants have dissected the 
articulable cause indicators one by one.  This sort of 
"divide and conquer analysis"…does not take into account 
the totality of the circumstances and runs contrary to 
the approach…which requires the court to view the facts 
and circumstances as a whole rather than isolating each 
indicator in turn. 
 
When [the officer] stopped the Lincoln for speeding the 
fact that the Lincoln was a large car from British 
Columbia was certainly in his mind.  He was alerted to 
look for other drug indicators.  In the course of 
obtaining [the driver’s] driver licence which he was legally 
entitled to do, [the officer] noticed several additional 
drug courier indicators:  cell phones, a pager, an open map 
and fast food wrappers inside the car.  The Budget 
Rental Agreement revealed the Lincoln was rented, 
another indicator.  To add to his suspicion the terms of 
the Agreement restricted driving to the province of 
British Columbia. 
 
The fact that the two duffle bags were on the inside of 
the car was extremely significant.  [The officer] could 
not understand why they were not in the large trunk of 
this car.  This was a factually objective and clearly 
expressed ground…confirming [the officer’s] reasonable 
suspicion there might be drugs taking up the trunk space. 
 
Furthermore, the drug courier indicators were not 
something [the officer] made up.  He had been trained to 
look for them.  [His partner] gave the same evidence … 
concerning the Drug Interdiction Course.  [The British 
Columbia Court of Appeal has] said it is unrealistic to 
suggest police officers cannot act on the assumption that 
a fellow officer's advice is reliable.  This would unduly 
hamper law enforcement.  The same statement applies to 
the training that [the officers] received on the Drug 
Interdiction Course.  The fact that [the officers] had 
not previously made a successful drug courier search 
based on the indicators does not necessarily invalidate 
the Drug Interdiction Course.  [The officer] said he 
observed more indicators in this case than any prior stop. 
 
In examination-in-chief [the officer] said he thought the 
Lincoln was "an expensive vehicle to be renting for what 
the driver and the passenger looked to me."  He made 
this comment as an additional observation to the indicia 
he outlined for suspecting the defendants might be drug 
couriers. 
 
Details of the meaning of this statement was not 
explored or explained in cross-examination.  I cannot say 
whether [the officer] was referring to the age of the 
defendants, their dress, grooming or their racial or 
ethnic origin.  (The defendants appear to be in the mid to 
late twenties age bracket.  Both have dark skins.  My 
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 best guess is they are of East Indian or middle East 
origin.) 
 
It was suggested in argument, that this remark masked a 
discriminatory bias based on irrelevant factors of colour 
and perhaps age.  There is nothing in the evidence to 
indicate the extent to which the observation influenced 
[the officer] in his assessment of the situation other 
than as one of several drug courier indicators.  There was 
no reflection of bias, discrimination or discourtesy during 
the investigation or after the arrest.  The conduct and 
politeness of [the officer] and the other officers was 
exemplary and inconsistent with bias or prejudice, I am 
unable to attach special weight or significance to the 
comment 
 
Viewing the facts and circumstances as a whole, rather 
than isolating each in turn, and bearing in mind that the 
standard for reasonable suspicion is less demanding than 
that for reasonable belief and can arise from information 
that is less reliable than that required to show 
reasonable belief, I find that when [the officer] decided 
to investigate he was not acting on a hunch.  He had 
articulable cause (reasonable grounds) for suspecting 
there might be drugs in the Lincoln. Therefore, when 
[the officer] asked [the driver] to step out of the car to 
question him, the resulting detention for investigative 
purposes was not arbitrary within the meaning of s. 9 of 
the Charter. (references omitted) 
 
The Search  
 
The accused contended that the smell of marihuana 
alone did not justify the search, that the search was 
not incident to arrest, and that the consent to search 
offered by the passenger was not properly informed. 
Thus it was suggested, the search was unreasonable 
and a violation of the accused’s s.8 Charter right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure. 
 
Plain Smell 
 
The accused argued that the odour of the marihuana 
did not justify the continued search. In rejecting this 
submission, the Court accepted the evidence of the 
officer that through his training and experience he was 
able to conclude that the strong odour was fresh 
marihuana, as opposed to a burnt odour.  Further, it was 
“unrealistic to think the smell of marijuana preceded 
the rental of the Lincoln” and “the only reasonable 
conclusion is that the smell came from marijuana placed 
in the Lincoln after it was rented by the defendants 
and was therefore in their possession at the time of 
the search”. Moreover, the officer’s reasonable 
grounds was based on more than just the smell and 
included the other drug indicators.  
Search Incident to Arrest 
 
A search that precedes an arrest can nonetheless be 
described as a search incident to arrest provided the 
officer has grounds to make the arrest before 
conducting the search. In this case, the officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe there were drugs in the 
car, but chose to search the interior and trunk prior to 
actually arresting the accused.  
 
Informed Consent 
 
For consent to be valid, it must be voluntary and the 
giver must be aware of (1) the nature of the police 
conduct they are consenting to, (2) their right to 
refuse the search, and (3) the consequences of giving 
the consent. Here, the officer asked the passenger if 
there were any drugs, guns, or tobacco in the vehicle, 
asked if the passenger would mind if he searched the 
car, told him that he would be charged if anything 
illegal was found, and told him he could withdraw the 
consent at any time. All the requirements of a consent 
search were satisfied; this placed the officer in a 
lawful position to detect the marihuana odour.  In 
finding the search reasonable, Justice Kurisko held: 
 
The duffle bags on the back seat instead of the trunk 
caused [the officer] to reasonably suspect there might 
be drugs in the trunk.  Thinking he required more than 
reasonable suspicion [the officer] asked permission to 
search.  However, the fact is that the consent of [the 
occupants] was not required.  The totality of the 
circumstances that gave rise to the detention logically 
justified searching the Lincoln for drugs, especially the 
trunk without a warrant or permission. 
 
The search met the Collins criteria:  it was authorized by 
law (articulable cause/reasonable suspicion), the law 
itself is reasonable…and the search was carried out in a 
reasonable manner. [The officer] was not abusive or 
overbearing.  He politely asked for permission to 
search.  The contents of the interior of the Lincoln were 
not significantly disturbed.  There was no search of the 
person.  [The officer] even asked permission to look in 
the bags in the trunk even though the trunk reeked of 
marijuana. The search that resulted in the seizure of the 
marijuana was not unreasonable within the meaning of s. 8 
of the Charter. 
 
Even if he was wrong in his conclusions, Justice Kurisko 
held the admission of the evidence essential to 
substantiate the serious charge would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The police 
acted in good faith, sought permission to search the 
trunk, and were courteous throughout the investigation.  
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 UNITED NATIONS CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS18 
 
Article 1 
 
 
 
Law enforcement officials shall at 
all times fulfil the duty imposed 
upon them by law, by serving the 
community and by protecting all 
persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high 
degree of responsibility required by their profession. 
 
Article 2 
 
In the performance of their duty, law enforcement 
officials shall respect and protect human dignity and 
maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons. 
 
Article 3 
 
Law enforcement officials may use force only when 
strictly necessary and to the extent required for the 
performance of their duty. 
 
Article 4 
 
Matters of a confidential nature in the possession of 
law enforcement officials shall be kept confidential , 
unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice 
strictly require otherwise. 
 
Article 5 
 
No law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or 
tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, nor may any law 
enforcement official invoke superior orders or 
exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a 
threat of war, a threat to national security, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency as a 
justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
Article 6 
 
Law enforcement officials shall ensure the full 
protection of the health of persons in their custody 
and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure 
medical attention whenever required. 
 
 
                                                 
18 G.A. res. 34/169, annex, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 186, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 
(1979) 
 
Article 7 
 
Law enforcement officials shall not commit any act of 
corruption. They shall also rigorously oppose and 
combat all such acts. 
 
Article 8 
 
Law enforcement officials shall respect the law and the 
present Code. They shall also, to the best of their 
capability, prevent and rigorously oppose any violations 
of them. Law enforcement officials who have reason to 
believe that a violation of the present Code has 
occurred or is about to occur shall report the matter 
to their superior authorities and, where necessary, to 
other appropriate authorities or organs vested with 
reviewing or remedial power. 
 
OFFENCE ACT POWERS OF 
ARREST: BRIDGING THE GAP 
Sgt. Mike Novakowski 
 
British Columbia’s Offence 
Act (the Act) contains 
various procedural rules 
for dealing with provincial 
offences. For example, s. 2 
of the Act provides that 
all provincial offences are punishable on summary 
conviction. Where an enactment is silent on punishment, 
s.4 of the Act provides a general maximum punishment 
on conviction for a provincial offence of six months 
imprisonment, a $2000 fine, or both. 
 
Section 133 of the Offence Act incorporates provisions 
of the Criminal Code respecting summary conviction 
offences into the Offence Act, where no or only partial 
provision is provided.  
 
 
s.133 Offence Act  
If, in any proceeding, matter or thing to which this Act 
applies, express provision has not been made in this Act or 
only partial provision has been made, the provisions of the 
Criminal Code relating to offences punishable on summary 
conviction apply, with the necessary changes and so far as 
applicable, as if its provisions were enacted in and formed part 
of this Act. 
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In the context of an arrest, if no arrest authority is 
found within a provincial statute or only partial 
provisions exists, the powers of arrest respecting 
summary offences under the Criminal Code apply to the 
provincial statute. In other words, the power of arrest 
for summary conviction offences found in s.495 of the 
 Criminal Code would be incorporated as forming part of 
the Offence Act and authorize arrest for provincial 
offences where no specific power of arrest has been 
created. 
 
Section 495(1)(b) of the Criminal Code authorizes a 
police officer to arrest a person whom the officer finds 
committing a criminal offence (includes summary 
conviction offences). 
 
s. 495(1)(b) Criminal Code 
A peace officer may arrest without a warrant…(b) a person 
whom he finds committing a criminal offence,  
 
However, prior to exercising the power of arrest under 
s.495 of the Code, the police officer must first give 
consideration to s.495(2) of the Code. 
 
s.495(2) Criminal Code 
A peace officer shall not arrest a person without warrant 
for  
(a) an indictable offence mentioned in section 553, 
(b) an offence for which the person may be prosecuted by 
indictment or for which he is  punishable on summary 
conviction, or 
(c) an offence punishable on summary conviction, 
in any case where 
(d) he believes on reasonable grounds that the public 
interest, having regard to all the circumstances including the 
need to 
(i) establish the identity of the person, 
(ii) secure or preserve evidence of or relating to the 
offence, or 
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the offence or 
the commission of another  offence, 
may be satisfied without so arresting the person, and   
(e)  he has no reasonable grounds to believe that, if he does 
not so arrest the person, the person will fail to attend court 
in order to be dealt with according to law.  
 
Therefore, prior to arresting a person for a provincial 
offence through s.133 of the Offence Act, which 
incorporates the provisions of the Criminal Code 
respecting summary conviction arrest, the arresting 
officer must consider public interest and court 
appearance. Public interest under the Criminal Code 
includes establishing the identity of the person, securing 
and preserving evidence, and preventing the continuation 
or repetition of the offence or commission of another 
offence. 
 
In Moore v. the Queen (1978) 43 C.C.C. (2d) 83 (S.C.C.), 
the accused was observed by a police officer pass 
through a red light without stopping, which constituted a 
violation under the Motor Vehicle Act. The officer 
stopped the accused who subsequently refused to 
identify himself. In addition to an arrest under the 
Criminal Code for obstructing a police officer being 
proper, the Supreme Court of Canada also concluded 
that s.101 of the Summary Convictions Act [now s.133 of 
the Offence Act] was properly interpreted to 
incorporate s.450 [now s.495] of the Criminal Code and 
authorize the arrest of the accused for the offence of 
proceeding against the red light; it was necessary to 
establish the accused's identity (public interest). 
 
Furthermore, s. 133 of the Offence Act not only 
incorporates the provisions of arrest respecting 
summary conviction offences, but also other provisions 
such as the use of force provisions of the Criminal Code. 
In Little v. Peers [1988] 47 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (B.C.C.A.), the 
plaintiff, who was arrested on an outstanding Offence 
Act warrant for non appearance on a traffic ticket, 
brought an action against the two arresting officers for 
false imprisonment and trespass. The Court found that 
s.25(2) of the Criminal Code (protection of persons 
administering and enforcing the law) applied to the 
execution of the warrant because s.122 [now s.133] of 
the Offence Act "incorporates all those provisions of 
the Criminal Code that apply in relation to summary 
convictions". 
 
Summary  
 
A police officer will have the authority to arrest for 
provincial offences by using the application of s.133 of 
the Offence Act if the following conditions are met: 
 
• the provincial statute creating the offence is silent 
as to whether a police officer has the power to 
arrest for that offence; 
• the police officer finds committing (i.e.  committed 
in the officer's presence); and 
• public interest or court appearance are not satisfied 
without arresting the person. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“The police culture is pragmatic and puts great 
emphasis on ‘commonsense’ and ‘experience’. But police 
seem unaware that, logically, these two qualities 
contradict each other. If policing is ‘all about 
commonsense’, why do people have to experience police 
work before they can understand it? Police work is a 
great deal more than ‘commonsense’”19. Home Office 
Research and Planning Unit, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office 
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19 London (1988) Home Office Research and Planning Unit. Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office. Edited by Peter Southgate. 
 WARRANTLESS DOORWAY 
ARREST REASONABLE 
R. v. Bate, [2002] M.J. No. 234 (MBPC) 
 
A mobile security guard called the 
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counsel and the breathalyzer demand. At the police 
station the accused provided two samples of his breath 
and was served with a certificate of analysis. 
 
During the voire dire to determine the admissibility of 
evidence, the accused argued, among other grounds, 
that the police conduct violated the principles outlined 
V
Opolice to report that when he 
approached a stopped truck with the 
driver’s door open in a parking lot of 
a credit union, the driver closed the 
oor and took off at a high rate of speed. The guard 
oted a puddle of vomit on the ground where the 
river’s door of the truck had been parked. The guard 
ollowed the accused, observed him run a stop sign, and 
onfronted the accused when he stopped in an alley. 
he guard suspected the accused might be intoxicated 
fter a few minutes, the accused drove down the alley 
nd parked at the rear of a residence. After obtaining 
he assistance of other security guards, the police 
ere called. 
he two attending officers had a description of the 
ruck, the licence plate number, and information the 
river was staggering and had vomited. They spoke with 
he security guard who provided a description of the 
river, indicated the driver was possibly impaired, and 
ointed out the residence the driver had attended. The 
fficers were aware that the registered owner of the 
ruck lived at the residence and they attended the 
ack door and knocked. The accused, who matched the 
escription of the driver, answered the door in 
tocking feet, opened both the inner wooden door and 
uter screen door, stood in the doorway, and asked, 
What the fuck do you want?” An officer told the 
ccused that they were investigating a possible 
mpaired driver and asked if the truck, which was 
isible from the backdoor, was his. After confirming it 
as his truck, the police asked several more questions. 
n response, the accused told the police he had been 
rinking at Classic Billiards, that he had too much to be 
riving, and that his “buddy” just drove him home. 
lthough initially reluctant, the accused provided his 
river’s licence to the officer.  
hile conversing with the accused, the officer noted a 
trong odour of liquor on the accused’s breath and that 
is eyes were bloodshot. The officer formed the 
pinion that the accused was impaired, took hold of his 
rm and told him that he was under arrest. The accused 
ried to pull away, a brief struggle resulted, and he was 
ubsequently handcuffed. He was confirmed to be the 
river by the security guard and was read his right to 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Feeney (1997) 
115 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), breaching his s.8 right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure. If the 
police had reasonable grounds to arrest him before 
they knocked on his door, they should have obtained a 
warrant. He also suggested that if the police did not 
have reasonable grounds to arrest, they had no right to 
enter onto his property to knock at his door in an 
effort to secure evidence against him. Furthermore, at 
the moment he attended the rear door, the accused 
argued he was detained and should have been provided 
his right to counsel. By failing to fulfill their obligation 
in this regard, the police violated his s.10(b) Charter 
right and any evidence following this point should be 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter.  
 
The Crown argued that the police were entitled to 
approach the door and knock under the doctrine of 
implied licence. Furthermore, they were entitled to ask 
some questions to further their investigation. Following 
the answers to these questions, the officer’s own 
observations, and the information received from the 
security guard, the officer formed the requisite 
reasonable grounds that entitled him to arrest the 
accused, who was on the doorstep and had left the 
sanctity of his home. Moreover, even if the Court did 
not accept the evidence that the accused was out on 
his doorstep at the time of arrest, and was still in the 
doorway as the accused suggested, the arrest was 
nonetheless justified as this was a case of fresh 
pursuit. 
 
Implied License to Knock 
 
Section 8 of the Charter protects “the privacy interest 
of an accused against unreasonable state intrusions” 
and nowhere does a person have a greater expectation 
of privacy than in their home. However, under the 
common law, the occupier of a home is deemed in law to 
grant permission to the public, including the police, to 
approach the door of their dwelling and knock for the 
purpose of conveniently communicating with them. This 
implied licence waives any privacy interest the occupier 
would otherwise have in the approach to the door of 
their residence. This licence however, does not extend 
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 so far as to include situations where the state’s 
intention is to gather evidence against the occupant.  
 
If the police enter with the intention of securing 
evidence in mind, they can no longer rely on implied 
license to justify their entry onto the property. In this 
case, Justice Giesbrecht of the Manitoba Provincial 
Court concluded that the “investigation of a possible 
offence does not necessarily mean that the police are 
there to gather evidence”. Although the police 
testified they entered onto the property to investigate 
the occupant for being an impaired driver, there were a 
number of reasonable explanations that could account 
for the citizen’s complaint and impaired driving was only 
one of the possibilities. In holding that the police were 
lawfully present at the back door when they knocked 
and did not exceed the implied invitation to enter onto 
the property, Justice Giesbrecht stated: 
 
Even if the police are investigating a possible offence 
committed by an occupant of a house it is in my view 
permissible for them to go to the door in order to 
communicate with the occupant. Even if the police believe 
that an arrest may eventually flow from their attendance 
at the house, this does not revoke their implied license to 
attend the door of the house. If the occupant chooses 
not to answer the door, the police may be able to do 
nothing further. However, where the occupant does 
answer the door the police are entitled to communicate 
with that person. 
 
And further: 
 
The police officers did not have grounds to obtain a 
warrant as they approached the door of the residence. 
While they were not entitled to attend the residence for 
the purpose of gathering evidence against the occupant, 
they were entitled to attend for the lawful purpose of 
communicating with the occupant. The fact that during 
the course of that communication they made 
observations which led to their reasonable grounds to 
make an arrest does not ex post facto make their 
attendance at the door of the residence unlawful. Based 
on the information they had received to that point they 
might for example have learned from the occupant that 
he had the flu or some other illness that would account 
for the observations made by [the mobile security 
guard]. The accused might not have displayed any signs of 
impairment. In that event the investigation would have 
been completed and that would be the end of the matter.  
 
The Arrest 
 
The accused argued that the warrantless arrest in the 
doorway of his home violated his Charter right under 
s.8 because he attended the door when the police 
knocked, which provided them with the opportunity to 
‘drag’ him from the doorway so he could be arrested 
outside the dwelling. Since Feeney, absent some limited 
exceptions, a warrant is generally required to enter a 
dwelling house to effect an arrest. Although the police 
in this case did not have a warrant when they arrested 
the accused at his residence, at the time of the arrest 
the police were not inside the residence. The Court 
found that  “entering a person’s driveway and going up 
the outer steps to a person’s house is a lot different 
than entering a person’s home without a warrant” and 
moreover, “there is minimal intrusion on privacy where 
an individual is arrested on the doorsill of his 
residence”. Justice Giesbrecht stated: 
 
The precise location of the accused at the time of the 
arrest can be described as follows:  the outer screen door 
of the residence was open with the accused holding it open 
with his arm and possibly [the officer] having his leg 
against the door as he was standing on the stoop. The 
stoop is not large, only about three by four feet. The inner 
wooden door was also open and was behind the accused. 
The accused was standing on the ledge between the two 
doors. The best way to describe it would be to say the 
accused was standing on the doorsill or threshold of the 
door.   
 
And further: 
 
The ultimate question is whether the arrest in this case 
occurred in a dwelling house. The fact that the accused 
came to the door in response to a knock by the police 
officers does not change the answer to that question in 
the particular circumstances of this case. I have found 
that the police were entitled to be at the door and to 
knock on it in order to communicate with the occupant. I 
am prepared to accept that the accused was standing on 
the doorsill in the open doorway of his house at the time 
of his arrest. At the same time I am not satisfied that in 
all the circumstances of this case it makes any 
difference whether he was standing on the doorsill or 
was standing one step away on the stoop. In my view in 
either event the arrest in this case did not occur in a 
dwelling house. The police were not in the house at the 
time of the arrest. While they were on the property of 
the accused, standing at the back door of his residence, 
they were entitled to be there pursuant to the common 
law implied invitation, which was not revoked prior to the 
arrest. 
 
An individual who is standing on the doorsill of his 
residence with the door open when he is arrested by 
police officers who are lawfully entitled to be at the 
door, is not arrested unlawfully even though the police do 
not have a warrant. He is not arrested in a dwelling house. 
In my view this conclusion is not inconsistent with the 
principles set out in the Feeney case. 
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 ......... 
Once the accused attended to the door of his residence 
the officers quickly made the observations that led them 
to conclude that he was impaired. [The officer] indicated 
that the accused matched the description of the 
individual that had been driving a motor vehicle a short 
time before. He had information that the accused was 
the registered owner of the vehicle in question. In these 
circumstances he had reasonable and probable grounds to 
make a demand under Section 254(3) of the Criminal 
Code for the accused to provide breath samples and to 
accompany the officers for that purpose.  
 
Instead of making a breath demand at that point, as he 
would be entitled to do if he had reasonable and probable 
grounds, [the officer] arrested the accused. I cannot 
find that this was unlawful just because the accused at 
the time was standing in the doorway of his residence. 
The situation would be very different if the police 
officers had gone inside the house to effect the arrest. 
It is not necessary in this case to determine if the result 
would be different if the door had not been open and the 
police had to open the door to effect the arrest.  
 
What other practical alternative did the police have? 
Defence counsel submits that the officers could have 
sought the consent of the accused to accompany them. 
That is one option but it is certainly not a practical one in 
the circumstances of this case. The accused had greeted 
the police officers with the question, "What the fuck do 
you want?" His attitude did not change during the rest of 
the brief conversation. An informed consent to 
accompany the officers was highly unlikely.  
 
In the absence of an informed consent, defence counsel 
submits that the only other legal alternative the police 
had was to leave one officer at the scene and have the 
other officer attend to a justice to obtain a Feeney 
warrant. In my view this alternative is completely 
impractical and would be pointless in circumstances such 
as those in the present case. There was no specific 
evidence as to how long it would have taken the officers 
to obtain such a warrant. However, even in a city such as 
Winnipeg where magistrates are on duty or on call at all 
hours it would not be unrealistic to expect that it would 
have taken at least an hour to obtain such a warrant. In 
the meantime the accused would have been out of the 
observation of the police officers, as they would not have 
had any right to enter the house in order to keep the 
accused under observation. As well the accused could at 
any time have revoked the implied consent for the police 
to be on his property. In these circumstances there 
would be little point in making the effort to obtain a 
warrant, as any attempt to secure accurate evidence of 
the blood alcohol concentration of the accused at the 
time of the driving would be lost.  
 
 
Fresh Pursuit 
 
Although the Court found the arrest lawful, Justice 
Giesbrecht nonetheless considered the Crown’s 
alternative argument that the police were in “hot 
pursuit” of the accused. This submission was rejected 
because the police did not have reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused before attending to the door. The 
fact the police formed reasonable grounds from their 
observations at the doorstep did not change the 
circumstances into one of hot pursuit.  
 
Right to Counsel 
 
The accused suggested that he was detained at the 
moment he answered the door, was not informed of his 
right to counsel under s.10(b) of the Charter, and any 
evidence obtained after this breach, including the 
observations of impairment, should be excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter. The right to counsel is 
triggered on arrest or detention. Here, the accused 
attended the door knowing that the police were there. 
He did not testify that he believed he was detained or 
that he was not free to go back into his home and close 
the door. He failed to satisfy the Court that he was 
detained when he answered the door or when he had 
the conversation with the police.  
 
The police had the right to ask for identification and 
whether he owned the truck in the driveway. The 
questions were not made to secure evidence against 
him, but were appropriate enquiries of the occupant. 
However, the questions concerning where he had been 
and how much he had to drink were likely to secure 
evidence against the accused. These questions were not 
appropriate and the responses to them would have been 
ruled inadmissible had the Crown sought to have them 
entered into evidence. Nonetheless, the physical 
observations of the accused’s impaired condition were 
made at a time the police were lawfully allowed to be at 
the door and were therefore admissible.  The evidence 
including the Certificate of Analysis was admissible.  
 
Editor’s note: The common law has long recognized an 
implied licence for all members of the public, including 
the police, to approach the door of a residence and 
knock20. Implied licence however, relates to the 
approach to the dwelling, not to the premises 
generally21, and ends at the door of the residence22. 
                                                 
20 R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) per Sopinka J. at para. 13, per Major J. at 
para. 40, R. v. Tricker (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 198, R. v. Hallet [1967] 2 All E.R. 407,  
21 Anderson v. Smith 2000 BCSC 1194. 
22 R. v. Tricker (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (Ont.C.A.) at p. 203. 
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 When a police officer acts "in accordance with this 
implied invitation, they cannot be said to intrude upon 
the privacy of the occupant23" and do not engage in 
unconstitutional activity24. Implied licence extends only 
to those activities for the purpose of communicating 
with the occupant and anything beyond this “licenced 
purpose” is not authorized. Synonymously, implied 
licence is known as implied invitation, invitation to 
knock25, implied invitation to attend26, implied licence 
to enter, door knocking, or knock and talk. 
 
Scope of Implied Licence 
 
In determining whether the activity of the police fell 
within the implied licence doctrine, the "underlying 
purpose or intent" of entry onto the property from the 
perspective of the police must be considered and 
carefully assessed27. In R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 
(S.C.C.), police attendance by acting on an anonymous 
tip and knocking at the door for the purpose of 
securing evidence against the owner (by sniffing for a 
marihuana odour) exceeded the scope of implied 
licence. However, circumstances where the police are 
not investigating the occupant or are "in the legitimate 
pursuit of evidence"28, short of conducting a search, 
may be lawful uses of implied licence. In R v. K.L & S.L. 
1999 BCCA 3729, police attendance at the residence of 
the accused to determine whether the accused owned a 
pair of shoes similar to the type of footprint left at 
the scene of a robbery "was a natural step in a series 
of enquiries in an investigation of possible suspects". 
The court found the "visit" of the police to the 
residence did not violate s.8 of the Charter. A 
circumstance where the sole purpose of the police 
officer is to ask questions of the homeowner, even 
investigative questions, does not exceed the bounds of 
implied right to approach and knock30. 
 
The approach to the residence will generally import the 
"requirement of a direct approach to the front door-
not a trespassory detour elsewhere on the property to 
secure evidence31". Since the purpose of implied licence 
is to enable a person, police officers included, to reach 
a point in relation to the house where normal and 
convenient communication may occur, an open porch 
door may constitute an invitation to proceed past the 
porch door to the outer door of the house proper32. 
Likewise, an approach to a dwelling that necessitates 
driving on a driveway and through some trees leading to 
the residence does not fall outside the scope of implied 
licence33. However, the act of surreptitiously looking 
through windows of a house, amounting to a perimeter 
search, goes beyond any waiver of privacy rights 
implied through the invitation to knock doctrine34. 
Similarly, visual observations by police at a basement 
apartment window made from a side-yard at a distance 
of two inches, was a violation of a person's reasonable 
expectation of privacy35. 
                                                 
                                                
23 R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) per Sopinka J. 
24 R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
25 R. v. Peters [1998] B.C.J. No.156 (B.C.S.C.), R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 
(Ont.S.C.J.) at para.28. 
26 R. v. Piasentini [2000] O.J. No.3319 (Ont.S.C.J.) 
27 R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.),  R. v. Mulligan [2000] O.J. No. 59 (Ont.C.A.) 
28 Anderson v. Smith 2000 BCSC 1194 
29 Police attended the residence of the accused and spoke to his mother. Upon 
questioning of whether her son owned a pair of Converse Illusion brand shoes she 
presented, on request, the shoes. 
30 R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 (Ont.S.C.J.) at para.33,  
31 R. v. Van Wyk [1999] O.J. No.3515 (Ont.S.C.J.) at para.35. 
 
A business establishment open to all members of the 
public impliedly invites those members to enter and 
there is no breach of privacy when a police officer 
enters the area of the premises to which the public is 
impliedly invited36. However, the police will be 
restricted from accessing private, non-public areas of 
the business37. The scope of implied invitation 
respecting a business establishment will be dependent 
on the circumstances and nature of the business. 
 
Implied licence also "extends to situations where the 
very purpose of entry is to protect the interests of the 
property owner or occupant" provided the police 
officer has a reasonable suspicion (articulable cause) 
that criminal activity is being perpetrated against the 
owner or occupant of the property38.  In R. v. Mulligan 
[2000] O.J. No.59 (Ont.C.A.) Sharpe J.A. held: 
 
It is plainly in the interests of a property owner or 
occupant that the police investigate suspected crimes 
being committed against the owner or occupant upon the 
property.  For that reason, absent notice to the 
contrary, a police officer may assume that entry for 
that purpose is by the implied invitation of the owner, 
particularly where entry is limited to areas of the 
property to which the owner has extended a general 
invitation to all members of the public. 
 
In R. v. Hern [1994] 149 A.R. 75 (Alta.C.A.), police 
entered a residence in response to a complaint of a 
break and enter in progress. While inside police 
 
32 R. v. Bushman (1968) 4 C.C.C. 17 (B.C.C.A.) 
33 R. v. Johnson [1994] B.C.J. No.1165 (B.C.C.A.) 
34 R. v. Peters [1998] B.C.J. No.156 (B.C.S.C.) 
35 R. v. Laurin (1997) 113 C.C.C. (3d) 519 (Ont.C.A.) 
36 R. v. Fitt (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 341 (N.S.C.A.) at p.346 affirmed (1996) 103 C.C.C. 
(3d) 224 (S.C.C.), R. v. Kouyas [1994] N.S.J. No.567 (N.S.C.A.) 
37 R. v. Kouyas [1994] N.S.J. No.567 (N.S.C.A.) 
38 R. v. Mulligan [2000] O.J. No,.59 (Ont.C.A.) 
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 discovered a marihuana grow operation. In determining 
the reasonableness of the police entry and search of 
the residence, the Court found “an inference can be 
drawn that the owner would welcome police to stop a 
break-in and protect the residents".  
 
Implied invitation to protect the occupant differs from 
implied waiver that gets an officer from the sidewalk 
to the doorstep to communicate with the occupant. 
Although they both waive the privacy expectation of 
the homeowner or occupant, the former concerns 
legitimate police enquiries in gathering information, 
such as neighbourhood enquiries following a break and 
entry (gets an officer to the door), while the latter 
involves the occupants expectation in the police acting 
on a reasonable suspicion (something more than a hunch 
but less than a reasonable belief) to protect the 
homeowner’s interests (gets the officer onto the 
property and in some cases into the premises39).  
 
Furthermore, homeowner interest waiver recognizes 
the need to investigate criminal activity perpetrated 
against the occupant, not by the occupant. Ultimately, 
the analysis will examine the motives of the police at 
the time of entry onto the property. In either case, 
the intention of the police is not to secure incriminating 
evidence against the homeowner. However, if while 
acting within the proper ambit of implied licence 
incriminating evidence is found, the entry and search is 
not turned into an unreasonable one merely because 
such evidence is discovered. 
 
Revoking Implied Licence  
 
Implied licence may be revoked on notice by the 
occupant40. Revocation may be done in advance of police 
attendance by the posting of signs41 such as "No 
admittance to police officers42", security fences 
preventing entry, or by oral revocation while the police 
are on the property. Once the occupant revokes or 
withdraws the implied licence, they must provide a 
reasonable opportunity for the police to leave43. If a 
police officer is assaulted while departing, a conviction 
of assaulting a police officer will stand44. If 
circumstances arise that would otherwise permit the 
officer to remain on the property, such as effecting an 
arrest, the implied licence revocation would not require 
the officer to leave.  
                                                 
39 See for example R. v. Kingbell 2002 SKQB 69 
40 R. v. Johnson [1994] B.C.J. No. 1165 (B.C.C.A.), R. v. Bushman (1968) 4 C.C.C. 17 
(B.C.C.A.) 
41 R. v. Evans (1996) 1 S.C.R. 8 (S.C.C.) 
42 Robson v. Hallet (1967) 51 Cr.App.R. 307 per Diplock L.J. 
43 R. v. Tricker (1995) 96 C.C.C. (3d) 198 (Ont.C.A.) at p. 205 leave to appeal to 
S.C.C. refused (1995) 103 C.C.C. (3d) vi. 
44 R. v. Forsyth [1982] B.C.J. No. 469 (B.C.S.C.) 
 
A police officer who is lawfully on property under 
implied licence who finds an occupant of that property 
committing an offence, may arrest that person and the 
subsequent arrest and continued custody will be lawful 
regardless of whether the occupant revokes the 
implied licence45. If the property owner withdraws the 
implied licence before the officer has grounds to make 
the arrest, the police officer must leave the property 
or risk becoming a trespasser. For example, where 
evidence of impairment was obtained after the implied 
licence was revoked causing the officer to be a 
trespasser, the officer is no longer acting in the lawful 
execution of his duty46. However, if grounds for arrest 
came into existence before the implied licence was 
withdrawn, the police are lawfully entitled to arrest. 
 
INVESTIGATIVE POWERS 
IMPLICIT IN VEHICLE STOP 
LEGISLATION 
R. v. Manickavasagar, 
[2002] O.J. No. 2907 (OntSCJ) 
 
A parking enforcement officer 
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parked on a street where he has 
found many abandoned and stolen 
vehicles, including many Hondas. The 
ngine was running, the windows were up, and unlike all 
ther vehicles parked on the street, the Honda’s 
indows were not frosted. Suspecting the vehicle might 
e stolen, he approached the vehicle to see if the 
gnition had been tampered, but found the accused 
leeping in the vehicle with the seat fully reclined. 
eturning to his vehicle, the parking enforcement 
fficer queried the licence plate on CPIC and learned 
he vehicle was under surveillance as a suspect vehicle 
n an armed robbery. This meant that officers would 
se their discretion in stopping the vehicle and if 
topped, the occupants were to be identified and the 
nformation forwarded to the robbery investigator. 
he parking enforcement officer then called the police. 
                                                
5 R. v. Mulligan [2000] O.J. No. 59 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Johnson [1994] B.C.J. No. 1165 
B.C.C.A.) 
6 R. v. Smith [1999] B.C.J. No. 908 (B.C.S.C.) 
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 Police approached the suspect vehicle on foot to 
investigate (1) whether the accused had been drinking 
and was sleeping off the influence, (2) whether he 
needed medical attention, and (3) to identify the 
occupant in response to the CPIC surveillance entry. 
After receiving no response to knocking on the driver’s 
window, the officer opened the unlocked driver’s door 
and detected an odour of liquor, concluding it emanated 
from the vehicle and the accused. The officer nudged 
the accused’s shoulder, waking him. He appeared 
groggy. After being asked for his driver’s licence, the 
accused provided his wallet, which was placed on top of 
the car. Thinking the accused was concealing something 
when the officer observed him fumbling with his hand 
in the area of his right rear pants pocket, the officer 
told the accused several times to keep his hands in 
view.  
 
After repeated requests to step from the vehicle, the 
accused exited. In plain view on the seat where the 
accused had been seated, the officer observed a 
handgun. The officer immediately grabbed the 
accused’s jacket to gain control of him, to effect an 
arrest, to prevent him from re-entering the vehicle, 
and to prevent him from possibly reaching for another 
gun. In doing so, the officer detected, by touch, the 
presence of another handgun on the accused’s person. 
The accused was handcuffed and charged with weapons 
offences; no alcohol related driving offences were 
pursued. During the voire dire to determine the 
admissibility of evidence, the accused argued that the 
actions of the police amounted to an unreasonable 
search and seizure and the evidence was inadmissible 
under s.24(2) of the Charter.  
 
Statutory Authority 
 
Justice MacDonald, of the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice began his enquiry into the matter by examining 
the statutory authority of police officers to detain 
drivers of vehicles found in Ontario’s Highway Traffic 
Act (Act). He concluded s.216 of the Act explicitly 
authorizes the police to stop, and therefore detain, the 
driver of a vehicle: 
 
s. 216 (1) Highway Traffic Act 
A police officer, in the lawful execution of his or her duties 
and responsibilities, may require the driver of a motor vehicle 
to stop and the driver of a motor vehicle, when signalled or 
requested to stop by a police officer who is readily 
identifiable as such, shall immediately come to a safe stop.   
 
Legitimate traffic related purposes to conduct such 
stops include checking driver’s licences, insurance, 
sobriety, and mechanical fitness. Implicit within this 
section are investigative powers which would allow the 
police to approach the running and occupied vehicle, 
open the door, wake the driver, demand a driver’s 
licence, and ask him to step from the vehicle. Similarly 
s.48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act also allows the 
police to stop vehicles, including stationary ones. 
 
s.48 (1) Highway Traffic Act 
A police officer, readily identifiable as such, may require the 
driver of a motor vehicle to stop for the purpose of 
determining whether or not there is evidence to justify 
making a demand under section 254 of the Criminal Code 
(Canada).   
 
The odour of alcohol gave the officer a suspicion, which 
he intended to investigate further by having the 
accused exit the vehicle so he could observe other 
signs of impairment justifying a demand under s.254 of 
the Criminal Code. Having exited the vehicle, the gun on 
the seat was in plain view.  
 
Common Law Authority 
 
Under the common law, the police may detain people if 
they have an articulable cause. In this case, the actions 
of the police in opening the door, touching the accused, 
waking him to make enquiries, requesting identification, 
and asking him to exit the vehicle were justified on the 
basis of articulable cause. Justice MacDonald stated: 
 
Clearly, [the officers] were acting in the course of their 
duties as police officers at the relevant time.  This is a 
necessary finding in this specific context. The detention 
of the accused and the resulting inquiries and requests 
made of him, including the request that he exit the 
vehicle, all arose from [the officer] having reasonable 
cause to suspect that the accused was engaging in 
criminal conduct which police had a duty to prevent and 
to investigate.  In making this finding respecting 
reasonable cause to suspect that the accused was 
engaging in criminal conduct, I refer firstly to the smell 
of alcohol emanating from the person occupying the 
driver's seat of a running vehicle who was asleep therein, 
in unusual circumstances, and the odour of alcohol 
emanating from the vehicle in which the accused, alone, 
was enclosed. 
 
The steps [the officer] took and demands or requests of 
the accused resulted in some intrusion upon the 
accused's liberty interests, but these intrusions were 
necessary for [the officer] to perform his duty of 
investigating and preventing criminal conduct, here 
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 consisting of possible impaired care and control of a 
motor vehicle.  The interference with the accused's 
liberty interests was minor, particularly given the 
reduced privacy interest of any person who chooses to 
sleep in a running motor vehicle parked on a public street, 
in the plain view of passers by.  In short, in my view, 
there is a very reduced privacy interest when a person 
chooses to act in public in a way which reasonably may be 
expected to attract public scrutiny.  
 
Furthermore, the police had a legitimate safety 
concern with respect to the accused’s hand movements. 
The accused had already produced his wallet to the 
police, but continued to fumble around his rear pants 
pocket. The Court stated: 
 
In my opinion, to the extent that [the officer’s] requests 
of the accused to exit the vehicle were based on safety 
concerns resulting from the accused's hand movements, 
these requests were necessary for [the officer] to 
resolve safety concerns, so that [the police] could 
proceed effectively with the ongoing, law investigation of 
the accused.  Resolving these justified safety concerns 
facilitated the completion of the investigation for which 
there was articulable cause. Resolving the justified 
safety concerns also permitted that investigation to be 
completed in an expeditious and effective and minimally 
intensive manner, as is required when an investigation is 
based on articulable cause. 
 
In my opinion, reasonable steps to ensure reasonable 
safety are part of the powers of police who have 
articulable cause for an investigative detention.  I note 
that if addressing such safety issues is not regarded as a 
power ancillary to investigative steps properly 
undertaken, the safety issues themselves may readily 
provide articulable cause for investigating a reasonable 
and justified apprehension of impending or planned 
criminal conduct directed towards police, for the purpose 
of preventing police from serving the public interest by 
completing the investigations which they initially 
undertook. 
 
In this case, the accused appeared to be hiding 
something. The request to exit the vehicle was partially 
intended to address a legitimate safety concern. Once 
the accused exited the vehicle, the gun was in plain 
view and the police were entitled to seize it under 
s.489(2) of the Criminal Code or by operation of the 
plain view doctrine. The subsequent grabbing of the 
accused was to arrest him, which became a search 
incident to arrest. This search and the subsequent 
seizure of the gun from the accused’s jacket, along 
with a magazine containing ammunition from his pants 
pocket, was lawful. The police conduct was authorized 
by statute and under the common law. The accused’s 
rights under the Charter were not infringed and all the 
evidence was admissible in the trial.   
 
OUTSIDE 911 CALL, BY ITSELF, 
DOES NOT JUSTIFY ENTRY 
R. v. Vickers, 2002 BCPC 0389 
 
A complainant, who could hear 
l
s
f
a
a
g
w
s
t
o
d
t
 
A
u
e
d
a
t
e
s
s
a
p
w
 
C
 
A
d
m
b
f
p
T
s
m
F
Volume 2 Issue 10 
October/November 2002 yelling, screaming, and door slamming 
at a residence called 911 to report a 
domestic dispute. Police responded 
and saw the accused on the front 
awn yelling into a cellular telephone. No yelling, 
creaming, or door slamming could be heard coming 
rom the house. The accused was told to stop his call 
nd two officers entered the home to “clear” it. After 
 recruit police officer found what was believed to be a 
row operation in a bedroom of the home, the accused 
as arrested for production of marihuana by a more 
enior member. The more senior member then entered 
he house to confirm the recruit’s observations and did 
bserve a marihuana grow operation. It was later 
etermined that there was not a domestic dispute at 
he home.    
 search warrant was subsequently obtained by fax 
nder the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and 
xecuted at the home. During the voire dire to 
etermine the admissibility of evidence, the accused 
rgued, in part, that the search warrant was issued on 
he basis of two unreasonable searches, the initial 
ntry into the home as well as the second confirmatory 
earch by the more senior officer. The Crown 
ubmitted that the first entry and search was 
uthorized by the common law duty of the police in 
rotecting life and property, while the second search 
as incidental to the arrest of the accused.   
ommon Law Search to Protect Life 
lthough the common law justifies forced entry into 
wellings to protect life and property, the police must 
ake some enquiry or take other investigative steps 
efore entering.  The 911 caller did not make the call 
rom within the house on this occasion, therefore the 
olice did not need to enter to check on their welfare. 
hey did not hear any screaming, yelling, or door 
lamming while they were at the house, nor did they 
ake any inquiries with anyone about the complaint. 
urthermore, even though the police testified that 
26
 domestics disputes pose safety risks and are 
unpredictable and emotional, there was nothing to 
support the need for immediate entry in this case. 
British Columbia Provincial Court Justice Bennett 
stated: 
 
[The police entered the accused’s] house solely on the 
basis of information supplied by an unknown complainant 
of unknown reliability. In my view, the constables’ 
common law duty does not extend so far as to make the 
911 call, in and of itself, an opportunity to enter the 
house. [The initial] search of the house [was] 
unauthorized and unreasonable within the meaning of s.8 
of the Charter. 
 
Moreover, the second search of the home was not 
authorized by the duty to protect life. This search was 
made to confirm the observations of the marihuana 
grow operation made by the recruit officer.  
 
Search Incident to Arrest 
 
The common law allows a police officer to search a 
lawfully arrested person and the area within their 
immediate surroundings. Since the accused was 
arrested on his front lawn, the house could not be 
properly characterized as immediate surroundings on 
these facts. Furthermore, there were no exceptional 
circumstances warranting the second search. The house 
had already been cleared and preservation of evidence 
was not a concern. Thus, this second search was also 
unreasonable and a violation of the accused’s rights 
under s.8. In excluding the evidence under s.24(2) of 
the Charter, Justice Bennett held: 
 
There is no doubt that police officers face numerous 
obstacles, legal and otherwise, in the course of their 
investigations of these operations. However, in this case, 
the end does not justify the means. Given the importance 
placed on the sanctity of a person’s home, the admission 
of the evidence would in my view bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
“Most of our faults are more pardonable than the 
means we use to conceal them”. Josephson Institue 
 
HANDCUFFING HISTORY: 
JUSTIFYING WRIST 
RESTRAINT 
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exercise reasonable and necessary force 
over persons under arrest or in lawful 
custody. When the police make an arrest, 
it is not uncommon for them to exercise 
control of the subject by using physical 
restraints in the interests of safety, to 
prevent escape, and/or prevent the 
destruction of evidence. The most common form of 
physical restraint is the use of handcuffs. This right to 
exercise control over a person in custody is not an 
unqualified right to use handcuffs on every occasion 
under any circumstance. Their application is subject to 
limits, which relates to the intended purpose of the 
handcuffs and the manner in which they are applied. 
 
Section 25 of the Criminal Code protects the police, 
among other persons, in using reasonable force when 
administering or enforcing the law. 
 
Every one who is required or authorized by law to do 
anything in the administration or enforcement of the 
law…(b) as a peace officer…is, if he acts on reasonable 
grounds, justified in doing what he is required or 
authorized to do and in using as much force as is necessary 
for that purpose. 
 
This would include custodial care of persons arrested. 
There are two issues arising when considering the 
application and use of handcuffs; permissible 
application (why and when) and appropriate application 
(how). These aspects are commonly intertwined. 
 
Permissible Application: Why & When? 
 
Early Canadian jurisprudence reasoned that the use of 
handcuffs was permissible where a prisoner had 
attempted or was likely to attempt escape. In Fraser v. 
Soy (1918) 30 C.C.C. 367 (N.S.C.A.), a civil case where 
the plaintiff was suing the police for false arrest and 
trespass in handcuffing, Justice Longley of the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal stated: 
 
If the [police officer] believed that it was necessary to 
handcuff them, I think that pretty nearly ended the 
matter. A policeman has always a right to judge of the 
circumstances attending a case, in the matter of a 
sudden arrest, and if he makes up his mind one way or the 
other it should be conclusive, only excepting one thing, 
27
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that is, if the circumstances under which the handcuffing 
is done were needless and gave reason to suspect that 
there was a particular desire to administer harshness in 
it, then it would probably be open to question; but usually 
a policeman is the sole judge of the circumstances under 
which he is to arrest, and the fact that there were 3 
[suspects] to 2 [policemen] seems to me sufficient 
authority. 
 
Sixty-one years later, in R. v. Cunningham (1979) 49 
C.C.C. (2d) 390 (Man.Co.Ct.), the court considered the 
use of physical restraint in the securing of a prisoner 
on board a ship following his arrest by the captain. The 
Court held: 
 
A peace officer or person affecting an arrest is legally 
entitled to secure his prisoner, such as by handcuffing 
him or binding him, if he does so reasonably and if he has 
good reason for doing so. 
 
Why handcuff? 
 
PROTECTION 
 Public 
 Police 
 Prisoner 
PREVENTION 
 Escape 
PRESERVATION 
 Evidence 
The Court in Cunningham condoned the use of physical 
restraints despite the fact they were applied without 
the belief the prisoner may escape. This judgment 
justifies the use of handcuffs beyond the necessity to 
prevent foreseeable likelihood 
of escape to include application 
for "good reason". "Good 
reason" for handcuffing could 
include the protection of the 
police from the prisoner, 
protection of the prisoner from 
self-abuse, and limiting the 
actions of the prisoner from 
destroying evidence. Police, by 
securing the prisoner, may then 
transport to a secure facility to 
perform a thorough search of 
the prisoner without fear 
evidence may be destroyed or 
rendered useless. 
 
Appropriate Application: How? 
 
Handcuffs, like any police "tool", requires skill and 
basic knowledge in their use and application. The skill 
level required under ideal conditions to apply handcuffs 
is minimal. However, the consequences of improperly 
applied handcuffs can result in injury. Handcuffs 
applied too loosely can be removed by the arrestee. 
Handcuffs applied too tightly can result in decreased 
blood flow through the area of restriction resulting in 
discomfort and/or injury to the wearer. 
 
In Carr v. Gauthier (1992) 97 D.L.R. (4th) 651, the 
Alberta Court of Queen's bench, among other 
pleadings, examined the police use of handcuffs applied 
by the police on the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an 
action against the defendant police officers for 
assault. Justice Cooke, in finding in favour of the 
plaintiff, stated: 
 
Two aspects however do trouble the court. First, the 
handcuffs were…far tighter than required. Secondly, and 
more important by reason of the intent manifested by it, 
the plaintiff was left in the police station for some 
extended period of time with his hands tightly cuffed 
behind his back because [the officer] could not find the 
keys to release him….I find that the plaintiff was 
deliberately left in this state as punishment for the 
verbal abuse and intimidation the [police] believed they 
suffered from the plaintiff. 
 
The Court found the retributive motivation was an 
inappropriate application of the handcuffs and 
constituted an assault on the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
was awarded $2500 in damages for humiliation, 
discomfort, soreness, and bruising.  
 
In Showler v. Shipley [1989] O.J. No. 2360 
(Ont.Dist.Crt.), the plaintiff brought an action against 
the police for assault and battery resulting from his 
arrest. The plaintiff was arrested at the site of a union 
strike in which the situation was described as " volatile 
and potentially violent". When examining the application 
of handcuffs on the plaintiff by the police, Justice 
McDermid stated, at page 16: 
 
The handcuffs were applied very quickly to immobilize 
the plaintiff and to prevent him from re-entering the 
fray. In the heat of the moment, they were applied 
incorrectly. In the circumstances, I cannot say that 
either Sergeant Carson or Constable Keutsch acted 
negligently in doing so or with any intention of harming 
the plaintiff or causing him discomfort. It must be 
emphasized that all of these events involving the plaintiff 
occurred within a matter of seconds in a hostile 
environment. 
 
Clearly, the motivation for and the situational 
application of the handcuffs are significant factors in 
assessing the appropriateness of handcuff use. As in 
Showler, it was recognized that the circumstances of 
the situation had bearing on the manner in which the 
handcuffs were applied. Under ideal handcuffing 
conditions, that of a submissive and cooperative 
prisoner, there would be no justifiable reason for 
improper application. However, with the introduction of 
external influences like a combative and resistive 
 individual, the "text book" application of the handcuffs 
is, in some cases, unlikely. 
 
In a more recent case, Gregory v. Canada 2002 CFT 
420, the plaintiff brought an action against the 
government in federal court alleging that her rights 
under the Charter were violated when she was arrested 
and handcuffed by a Customs officer. Federal Court 
Justice Lafreniere held that a peace officer must 
establish a reasonable basis for justifying the use of 
restraints. In this case, the officer testified that he 
was attempting to eliminate any possibility of escape or 
injury. Even though the possibility of escape is difficult 
to gauge, the Court refused to second-guess the 
officer and found it “was reasonable in concluding that 
the handcuffs were required”. Furthermore, “the 
interests of enforcement officers in ensuring their 
personal safety and that of the detained person and 
the public must be taken into account”. However, the 
Court made the following caution: 
 
My decision should not be interpreted as condoning a 
blanket policy of handcuffing suspected persons. The 
public expects enforcement officers to set high 
standards of truthfulness and honour; while 
demonstrating a devotion to duty.  They also expect that 
the officers will be responsible and accountable in their 
use of the powers provided by law. The unvarying use of 
handcuffs on all persons arrested without regard for the 
seriousness of the offence, a reasonable apprehension of 
violence, risk of escape, or the condition of the arrested 
person is improper.  
 
Police Accountability and Handcuffing 
 
If a person believes they are subject to an improper 
use or application of handcuffs, there are several 
avenues for redress. Although the police are lawfully 
entitled to exercise reasonable and necessary force in 
effecting an arrest, the police are criminally 
responsible if the force is excessive. If a court finds 
that the application of handcuffs was excessive, an 
officer could be found guilty of assault or subject to 
the findings of a civil court and found liable for 
negligence or assault and/or battery.  
 
Furthermore, the aggrieved party may apply to a court 
for remedy under the Charter if it can be established 
that the person's rights had been infringed. The court 
may award financial compensation or another 
appropriate remedy under s.24. The police may also be 
subject to internal disciplinary proceedings, a public 
hearing, or intense media attention for the misuse or 
misapplication of handcuffs. 
Summary 
 
The law authorizes the police to use necessary and 
reasonable force when making an arrest. One such 
example of force is the application of physical 
restraints, or handcuffs. Handcuffs must be applied 
for a legitimate purpose and in a reasonable manner. 
Handcuffs are not an instrument intended to be used 
for the purposes of humiliating or punishing the 
arrestee. Handcuffs are however, when used for a bone 
fide purpose, an invaluable tool for protecting the 
police, protecting the prisoner, preventing escape, and 
preserving evidence. 
 
LACK OF RECORDING PRODUCES 
‘CREDIBILITY CONTEST’ 
BETWEEN POLICE & SUSPECT 
R. v. Francis, 
(2002) Docket:C35342 (OntCA) 
 
The accused appealed his convictions 
for three bank robberies. In allowing 
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and ordering a new trial, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal considered the 
failure of the police to tape record their interview with 
the accused and the impact this has in assessing 
whether the statement was voluntary.  It is the role of 
the Court to scrutinize all of the circumstances 
surrounding the taking of a statement and determine 
whether the statement is admissible under the common 
law confessions rule, which requires the Crown prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was 
voluntary. At para. 8, the Court stated:  
 
[W]e also think that in admitting the [accused's] 
statement, the trial judge failed to give adequate 
consideration to the investigating officer's failure, in the 
circumstances, to tape record the conversation, thereby 
setting up a credibility contest between himself and the 
[accused].  
 
This case underscores the importance of recording 
statements of accused’s persons. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on 
 
Editor's Note: In Francis, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal referred to an earlier decision of the Court (R. 
v. Moore-McFarlane (2001) Docket: (OntCA). In that 
case the Court thoroughly reviewed the confessions 
rule and made the following comment:  
29
  
However, the Crown bears the onus of establishing a 
sufficient record of the interaction between the suspect 
and the police. That onus may be readily satisfied by the 
use of audio, or better still, video recording. Indeed, it is 
my view that where the suspect is in custody, recording 
facilities are readily available, and the police deliberately 
set out to interrogate the suspect without giving any 
thought to the making of a reliable record, the context 
inevitably makes the resulting non-recorded interrogation 
suspect.  In such cases, it will be a matter for the trier 
of fact to determine whether or not a sufficient 
substitute for an audio or video tape record has been 
provided to satisfy the heavy onus on the Crown to prove 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Thus, it would appear that although there is no 
affirmative duty on the police to record interviews, 
where recording equipment is available but the police 
fail to use it, the voluntariness of the non-recorded 
interview will be inherently suspect because of the 
absence of a recording. Of course, non-recording of a 
statement does not automatically render it 
inadmissible. It will be the role of the Crown to 
nonetheless prove the statement voluntary beyond a 
reasonable doubt, even without a recording.  
 
OFFICER NOT QUALIFIED TO 
GIVE EVIDENCE OF HGA 
SOBRIETY TEST 
R. v. Badry, 2002 BCPC 353 
 
A police officer stopped the accused 
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HGA test. Although the officer believed (subjectively) 
that the accused's eyes, which exhibited lack of 
smooth pursuit, involuntary deviation to the side, and 
involuntary jerking provided clues of impairment, these 
test results must also provide an objective basis for 
such a belief. Even though the officer testified he 
acquired the knowledge and skill to conduct HGA tests 
during his training, the Crown did not attempt to 
qualify him as an expert. In finding a breach of the 
accused's right to be secure against unreasonable 
search and seizure, Justice Tweedale stated: 
 
The constable's HGA test evidence is not admissible to 
support his conclusion that the accused was impaired, on 
the objective branch of the test. Even if it were 
admitted, [the constable] failed to make clear in an 
understandable and meaningful way how the three 
failures by the accused in both eyes was used to support 
the constable's conclusion of those failures being clues 
of impairment, nor what importance he gave to the 
failure in each instance. In other words, the constable's 
conclusion of HGA test failure amounts to little more 
than a bare statement of failure without reasons. [The 
constable] was taught that certain signs mean failure or 
impairment, but he could not or did not articulate the 
reasons how or why, and of course he was not entitled to 
do so without a declaration that he is an expert. 
 
The only evidence of impairment that remains then is a 
moderate smell of liquor, an admission to drinking a very 
modest amount of liquor, and two physical tests which 
the accused substantially passed. The constable did not 
have reasonable and probable grounds objectively for 
believing the accused's ability to drive was impaired by 
alcohol. This is a breach of Section 8 of the Charter. 
 
V
Ofor an obscured licence plate and 
asked for his driver's licence and 
registration. The officer detected a 
moderate odour of alcohol and was 
old that the accused had recently consumed liquor. 
he officer then asked the accused to perform 
obriety tests: the walk and turn test, the one leg 
tand test, and the Horizontal Gaze Astigmas (HGA) 
est. As a result, the officer formed reasonable 
rounds to make the breathalyser demand and the 
ccused subsequently failed the breathalyser tests. At 
rial, British Columbia Provincial Court Justice 
weedale found the officer did not have reasonable 
rounds to make the demand.  
n concluding that the accused performed the walk and 
urn test and one leg stand test "very well", Justice 
weedale held that the officer was not qualified to 
ive the expert opinion evidence necessary to use the 
The certificate of breath results was excluded and the 
accused was found not guilty. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
NON-OFFENSIVE ‘PROFILING’ 
BOLSTERS GROUNDS FOR 
DETENTION 
R. v. Villatoro, 2002 BCPC 0431 
 
A police officer on patrol observed 
V
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known Hispanic drug traffickers, 
walking in the downtown eastside of 
ancouver. About a half hour earlier, the officer had 
bserved the two known traffickers circle the block 
pparently to avoid police observation. Because the 
ccused was unknown to the officer, he decided to stop 
30
 and identify him. The officer pulled his vehicle in front 
of the men and asked them to stop. The two known 
males stopped, but the accused continued walking. The 
officer again requested the accused stop, but he 
continued walking and the officer noticed he was 
swallowing something. Believing he may be swallowing 
drugs, the officer told the accused to open his mouth 
and stick out his tongue. Because the accused continued 
swallowing, the officer took hold of one of the 
accused’s arms and also applied a pressure hold to 
either side of his neck to prevent him from swallowing. 
The officer observed numerous white rocks, or cubes, 
wrapped in cellophane at the front of his mouth. The 
accused was taken to the ground, handcuffed and 
searched. In the small of his back police found a golf 
club as well as 30 rocks of cocaine in his pants pocket. 
On the ground near the accused’s head police found a 
small plastic wrapped rock of cocaine. He had swallowed 
most of what was in his mouth.   
 
The accused argued that the officer did not have 
reasonable grounds to arrest him when he squeezed his 
neck to prevent him from swallowing. This, it was 
suggested, amounted to a violation of the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure. The 
Crown contended that there was no violation and the 
search was reasonable. All warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable and the Crown bears the 
burden of proving that the search was nonetheless 
reasonable. In addressing whether the police have the 
power to detain persons for investigative purposes, 
Justice Maughan stated: 
 
There is no dispute police officers are entitled to 
stop and question people on the street and detain 
them momentarily for investigation, but unless there 
are reasonable and probable grounds for their 
arrest, police officers must allow them to proceed. 
 
In this case the officer was about to stop the accused 
to identify him, but his attention was diverted to a 
narcotics investigation when he observed what he 
believed to be an attempt to swallow drugs. This was 
observed before the accused was physically detained 
and along with other factors provided the officer with 
articulable cause to physically stop and search him. 
Jusitice Maughan held:  
 
It is clear the officer had articulable cause to 
detain and search the accused’s mouth for the drugs 
he believed he was swallowing. In coming to this 
conclusion the officer relied on the fact that [the 
accused] was with two known Hispanic drug 
traffickers, the accused appeared to be Hispanic, 
the fact that in his experience known drug dealers 
tend to recruit others in the trade, the area of town 
being commonly known as a high area for drug 
trafficking, the apparently evasive actions taken by 
the two known drug traffickers a half hour earlier 
close to that area, the accused’s body language and 
behaviour as well as the officer’s extensive 
experience in seeing drug dealers hold drugs in their 
mouths and attempt to swallow them when 
confronted by the police. 
 
This is not a case where a police officer has stopped 
an accused and impeded his progress prior to seeing 
any indication of behaviour associated with drug 
trafficking. 
 
In my view, it is an error to say that the officer is 
guilty of inappropriate racial profiling since his 
experience is that Hispanic males tend to stay 
together and recruit other Hispanic males into the 
drug trafficking milieu. In my view this is not 
offensive profiling but rather simply a reflection of 
an unhappy reality in the drug infested area in the 
400 block of Columbia Street. There is no evidence 
[the officer]  would have prevented [the accused] 
from walking away had he not seen any familiar 
inculpatory body language and the typical swallowing 
motion of a drug trafficker. Although it is possible 
the accused was simply swallowing food, he had no 
food in his hands and the surrounding circumstances 
make such an inference unreasonable and unlikely. 
 
The court concluded that the police did not violate the 
accused’s rights under the Charter and the evidence 
was admitted. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
  
TRAFFIC STOP & SUBSEQUENT 
SEARCH JUSTIFIED: DRUG 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Casselman, 2002 MBQB 247 
 
An experienced police officer and 
his recruit were on general patrol in 
a high crime area when they 
encountered a vehicle in which the 
driver appeared to be surprised at 
their presence. The licence plate was queried by 
computer and the officers learned the vehicle was 
rented. Despite no traffic violations being observed, 
the police stopped the car. The experienced officer 
testified that he had a number of concerns including (1) 
that the vehicle may have been stolen but not yet 
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 reported because it was a holiday (Canada Day), (2) the 
driver might be a drug “dial-a-dealer” based on his 
experience with traffickers using rental vehicles to 
avoid confiscation of their own property, and (3) the 
driver’s licence status could not be confirmed by 
computer from the rental vehicle information. Relying 
on motor vehicle legislation, the accused was stopped 
and questioned about the rental vehicle and his driver’s 
licence. While waiting for the production of the rental 
agreement and drivers licence, the officer noted that 
the driver was very nervous and trembling and that 
there were two cell phones and a pager on the front 
seat. The rental agreement that was subsequently 
produced named an individual (not the accused) who was 
the only person permitted to drive the vehicle and who 
was associated to an address connected to the Hell’s 
Angels.  
 
When the accused produced his driver’s licence, which 
was expired, the officer observed a large number of 
bills in the accused’s wallet. Furthermore, the accused 
moved his jacket from the front floor of the vehicle 
and covered the cell phones and pager. The accused was 
asked to step from the vehicle. After asking whether 
he had any weapons or drugs on him, the officer 
conducted a quick pat-down search and found a “Kinder 
Surprise egg” in his sock containing drugs. As a result 
of the stop and search, the accused was charged with 
possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking 
and possession of proceeds of crime.  At trial, the 
accused argued, among other grounds, that the police 
used the Highway Traffic Act as a ruse to justify 
pulling the vehicle over and conduct an unauthorized 
investigation, which amounted to an arbitrary 
detention. Further, even if the initial stopping of the 
accused was lawful, the continued detention was 
arbitrary and the resultant search was unreasonable 
since there was insufficient grounds to arrest the 
accused for anything.  
 
The Stop 
 
In concluding that the actions of the police were 
justified, Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench Justice 
Keyser first examined the legitimacy of the initial stop. 
The officer stated he was relying on motor vehicle 
legislation to stop the vehicle and the court found that 
it was "neither sinister nor surprising that a veteran 
officer would appreciate that his authority to stop a 
vehicle is derived from a section of the Highway 
Traffic Act". Although the Highway Traffic Act did 
not explicitly require a driver to produce a rental 
agreement, Justice Keyser found this similar to asking 
for insurance. The officer did not ask any questions 
about drugs nor did he search the vehicle. It was at 
this time that further observations made by the 
officer justified continued detention outside the scope 
of motor vehicle concerns: 
 
The combination of observations by [the officer] as 
to the rolled bills, the pager and cell phones, along 
with the accused's extreme nervousness, met the 
standard of articulable cause in my view and allowed 
further investigation.  
 
The Search 
 
Incident to an investigative detention, the police are 
entitled to search the detainee provided it is minimally 
intrusive under the circumstances. Justice Keyser 
stated: 
 
The search of the accused was a quick pat-down 
search, above the clothing, that was not invasive. It 
was at this time that the drugs were discovered in a 
Kinder Surprise egg in his sock. Prior to the pat-
down, the accused was asked by [the officer] 
whether he had any weapons or drugs on him. 
Counsel for the accused cross-examined [the 
officer] closely as to how drugs could be used as a 
weapon and argued that it was not a bona fide 
search for weapons, but a fishing expedition for 
drugs. [The officer] replied that he always asked 
the question that way, but in my view nothing turned 
on that. If [the officer] was entitled to search 
pursuant to the detention of the accused for 
security reasons, then he could do so, and the drugs 
were easily discoverable.  
 
In this case, "there existed very real indicators of 
criminal activity that, at the very least, permitted 
a further detention to investigate and 
corresponding right to search in a reasonable and 
unobtrusive manner before placing [the accused] in 
a police car". 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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Academy at (604) 528-5733 or e-mail at 
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